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ALL THE SOVEREIGN’S AGENTS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CREDENTIALS OF ADMINISTRATION
Kate Jackson*

[P]rerogative being nothing, but a Power in the hands of the Prince
to provide for the publick good, in such Cases, which depending
upon unforeseen and uncertain Occurrences, certain and unalterable
Laws could not safely direct, whatsoever shall be done manifestly
for the good of the People, and the establishing the Government
upon its true Foundations, is, and always well be just Prerogative.
—Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Ch. XIII ¶ 1581
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INTRODUCTION
We face no less than four urgent crises: an ongoing pandemic;2 racial injustice
and its consequent civil unrest;3 an economic depression approaching the pain
* Assistant Professor, University of Dayton Law School. PhD, Columbia University; JD,
William & Mary Marshall Wythe School of Law; LLM, Temple University Beasley School
of Law. I thank the participants in the Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire en Philosophie
Politique and ClassCrits for their useful commentary and direction, as well as Luke Herrine
and the LPE Project for their ideas and encouragement.
1
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 3 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690) (ch. XIII, ¶ 158).
2
E.g., Exec. Order No. 14,002, 86 Fed. Reg. 7229 (Jan. 22, 2021); Exec. Order No.
13,995, 86 Fed. Reg. 7193 (Jan. 21, 2021).
3
E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 20, 2021).
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inflicted in 1929;4 and the accumulating, existential threat of climate change.5 Citizens
must rely on their state to tackle these burning perils.6 Yet critics both left and right
would tear down its institutional capacity to do so.7 Some denounce the exercise of administrative power as illiberal, unconstitutional, and obnoxious to the rule of law.8
Others impugn it as undemocratic, paternalistic, and corrupt.9 Yet without some kind
of agent to carry out collective solutions, these perils may very well proceed unabated.
Pushing an anti-administravist10 agenda, libertarians continue their “long war”11
against government agencies by insisting that they are an unconstitutional fourth
branch of government. For them, administration is a kind of “absolutism” that violates
the separation of powers and defies the principle of limited government.12 They
4

See generally David C. Wheelock, Comparing the COVID-19 Recession with the Great
Depression, 39 ECON. SYNOPSES (Aug. 12, 2020).
5
E.g., Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 (Jan. 27, 2021).
6
See generally JEDIDIAH PURDY, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW
COMMONWEALTH (2019); Jedidiah Britton-Purdy, The World We’ve Built, DISSENT MAG.
(July 3, 2018), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/world-we-built-sovereign
-nature-infrastructure-leviathan [https://perma.cc/HD5H-YMGH] (describing the “Leviathan”
required to deal with climate change); Adam Tooze, Shockwave, 42 LONDON REV. BOOKS
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v42/n08/adam-tooze/shockwave [https://
perma.cc/L7EY-7GBX] (describing the leadership and state capacity required to tackle the
pandemic and its disastrous economic implications).
7
Compare Wolfgang Streeck, The Return of the Repressed, 104 NEW LEFT REV. 5,
12–13 (2017) (agencies’ exclusionary elitism regarding experts contributes to populist blowback); Andrew Arato, How We Got Here: Transition Failures, Their Causes and the Populist
Interest in the Constitution, 45 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 1106, 1108 (2019) (executive power
contributes to a democratic deficit that drives populism); Albena Azmanova, The Crisis of
Europe: Democratic Deficit and Eroding Sovereignty—Not Guilty, 24 L. & CRITIQUE 23,
33–35 (2013) (technocratic government is insufficiently responsive to the undesirable consequences of its actions); JURGEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY: STUDENT
PROTEST, SCIENCE AND POLITICS 81–82 (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., Beacon Press ed. 1970)
[hereinafter TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY] (instrumental rationality, when performed by
government bureaucracy, becomes a form of domination); and THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END
OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 233 (1969) (arguing that the welfare state is an example of how private interest groups colonize public lawmaking), with Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2017) [hereinafter 1930s Redux] (describing proposed anti-administrative
regulation and judicial suspicion of agency power—particularly that of Justice Gorsuch); see
generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
8
See HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 7.
9
See Streeck, supra note 7, at 15.
10
This Article adopts the morphological derivation of “administrative” as seen in Metzger,
1930s Redux, supra note 7, at 7.
11
Charles H. Koch, Jr., James Landis: The Administrative Process, 48 ADMIN. L. REV.
419, 420 (1996).
12
HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 6; see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1994) [hereinafter The Rise and Rise]; Gary
Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335–37 (2002) [hereinafter
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contend that agencies’ discretionary rulemaking offends the liberal commitment to
the rule of law.13 Accordingly, they would punt agencies’ responsibility for social,
economic, and environmental problems to courts and legislatures.14 Regulation would
thus be placed at the mercy of an undemocratic judiciary who increasingly “weaponizes” the First Amendment in favor of big business15—or of a Congress whose
already inefficient decision-making is crippled by hyperpolarization16 and distorted
by the kind of material inequalities that the welfare state is meant to ameliorate.17
Conservatives with a more authoritarian inflection seek to recall administration
from its constitutional exile by subsuming it under presidential power.18 Such critics
would lend administration some democratic credentials by bootstrapping them to the
president’s electoral accountability. Yet ridding agencies of their independence by
placing them under the discretion of the president grants the president personal control
Delegation and Original Meaning]; RICHARD EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE
CONSTITUTION 12–13 (2006); JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 4 (2017); Larry Alexander
& Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1298–99 (2003). See generally Jeremy K. Kessler, The Political Economy of “Constitutional Political Economy,” 94 TEX. L. REV. 1527 (2016). For a
recent opinion implementing this view, see Florida v. Becerra, No. 8:21-cv-839-SDM-AAS,
2021 WL 2514138, at *31–37 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2021).
13
HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 35–36, 50, 67–68, 72; ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4 (2010). For
theoretical discussions, see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 27–28
(Vol. II, 1976); PIERRE ROSANVALLON, GOOD GOVERNMENT 25–26 (2018).
14
See, e.g., H.R. 5, 115th Cong. §§ 103, 202 (2017–2018) (increasing the constraints
imposed on agency rulemaking and enhancing de novo judicial review of agency actions);
LOWI, supra note 7, at 301.
15
See Jedidiah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses Constitution: The First Amendment and Class
Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 2162 (2018) (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting)).
16
See, e.g., MATTHEW HOLDEN, JR., CONTINUITY AND DISRUPTIONS: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 225–26 (1996); BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW: ORIGINS AND
ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 16 (2019).
17
Peter L. Strauss, Eroding ‘Checks’ on Presidential Authority: Norms, the Civil Service,
and the Courts, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 581, 585 (2020); Michael A. Livermore & Daniel
Richardson, Administrative Law in an Era of Partisan Volatility, 69 EMORY L.J. 1, 45 (2019).
18
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 13, at 12–15; CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 13 (J.P. Seitzer trans., Duke Univ. Press 2004) (1932) [hereinafter LEGALITY AND
LEGITIMACY] (“[T]he newly created financial bureaucracy . . . found the possibility of a new
basis in the plebiscitary legitimacy of the German President elected by the entire German
people.”); K. Sabeel Rahman, Reconstructing the Administrative State in an Era of Economic
and Democratic Crisis, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1671, 1673 (2018). Recent cases showing this
inclination include, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (buffering PCAOB commissioners from presidential oversight is
unconstitutional); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020);
and Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1784–85 (2021).
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over agency policymaking and adjudication without the checks provided by Congress,
the courts, or an independent civil service.19 It arguably solves a separation-of-powers
problem by introducing a new one.20 More ominously, empowering the president with
the patina of democratic legitimacy emits a strong whiff of Schmittian politics.21 The
prospect of a largely unbound executive officer claiming a popular mandate to hire
and fire civil servants on a whim should alarm any that followed the Trump Administration’s treatment of refugees, civil protestors, polluters, and political cronies.
Agency power likewise fares poorly in the hands of the left.22 They blame
administrative technocracy for a variety of social and political ailments: the reification
of social differences and the juridification of human nature;23 corruption, privatization
and regulatory capture;24 the depoliticization of economic issues and the subsidization
of globalized financial capitalism25 and, ultimately, the constellation of conspiratorial
populist politics currently threatening liberal democratic states.26 Their preferred solutions include democratizing agency decision-making27 and constraining Congress’
capacity to delegate its law-making function.28 While their interventions are welcome,
19

See, e.g., ADAM B. COX & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, THE PRESIDENT AND IMMIGRATION LAW 7–8 (2020); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018).
20

DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 145 (Routledge 2017) (1948); cf. ADRIAN
VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION (2016) (arguing that no such problem exists because Congress
knowingly delegated such policymaking to the executive).
21
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 13, at 53–54, 90–91; Samuel Moyn, The Guardians,
THE NATION (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/eric-posner-dema
gogues-playbook/ [https://perma.cc/N4LU-D69V]; James Chappel, Nudging Towards Theocracy: Adrian Vermeule’s War on Liberalism, DISSENT MAG. (2020), https://www.dissentmag
azine.org/article/nudging-towards-theocracy [https://perma.cc/4HCL-JZAM]. We can observe
this dynamic in Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v. United States, when he states that “to
allow the nation’s chief law enforcement officer to write the criminal laws he is charged with
enforcing . . . would . . . invite the tyranny of the majority.” 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2145 (2019). For
a discussion of the shaky democratic credentials of unitary executive power in the context of
the new Biden Administration, see Ashraf Ahmed and Karen Tani, Presidential Primacy Amidst
Democratic Decline, 135 HARV. L. REV. F. 39 (2021).
22
See Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 348–50 (2019)
(arguing that left-wing worries about agency legitimacy opened space for right-wing deregulatory reform).
23
HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 121–22; Michel Foucault,
Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87–104 (Graham
Burchell et al. eds., 1991). For a discussion and summary of these critiques, see EMERSON, supra
note 16, at 7–8, 65.
24
See generally LOWI, supra note 7, at 12856; JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP:
PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2017).
25
Streeck, supra note 7, at 12–13; Azmanova, supra note 7, at 28.
26
See ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 162; see generally Arato, supra note 7.
27
Rahman, supra note 18, at 1676; EMERSON, supra note 16, at 17–18.
28
See, e.g., Robert Goodin, Welfare, Rights and Discretion, 6 OXFORD J. LEG. STUDIES
232, 250–53 (1986); Thomas Christiano, Democracy and Bureaucracy, 71 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RSCH. 211, 212 (2005); ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 160.
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they may deprive government of the nimble expertise necessary to address environmental and economic crises.29 Moreover, as illustrated by the president’s extraordinary powers to shape national immigration policy despite its “notoriously complex
and detailed statutory structure,” increasing the amount of formal legislation may
only expand agencies’ enforcement discretion.30 Agency democratization, furthermore,
risks reproducing, perhaps under the cover of ostensible public consensus, the same
social, economic and political inequalities that distort Congressional law-making.31
This Article contends that this multipronged anti-administravist attack stands upon
shaky conceptual foundations. Each builds atop a theory of constitutionalism that
embraces a too-literal conception of popular sovereignty.32 It is a conception that
posits that there is, in fact, a “people” with a sovereign “will.” It is a “will” that can be
clearly identified through elections; straightforwardly transcribed through law-making;
mechanically applied by administrators and constrained by judges.33 But in a country
of hundreds of millions, the diverse multiplicity of citizens could never find a common will.34 It is even more impossible that it could ever be accurately expressed
through the law-making of elected representatives.35 As a result, critics of administration often grant statutory law-making more democratic credentials than it deserves.36
29

See James Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts, 47 YALE L.J. 519, 530 (1938).
COX & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 19, at 7–8.
31
See LOWI, supra note 7, at 297314; EMERSON, supra note 16, at 76 (agency democratization reproduced racial bigotry); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1764 (1975) [hereinafter The Reformation of Administrative Law] (collective action problems and the involvement of unaccountable public interest organizations skew
attempts at agency democratization); Theda Skocpol & Kenneth Finegold, State Capacity and
Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 255, 265 (1982) (arguing that
the NRA, despite its goals of incorporating labor and consumer interests, became captured
by business).
32
See Jurgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1,
9–10 (1994); discussed infra at Section I.A.
33
Discussed infra at Sections I.A, I.B.
34
See, e.g., CLAUDE LEFORT, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL THEORY 13–14 (David Macy
trans., 1988); HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT
THE ENDS OF POLICY 65 (2002).
35
See Michael Saward, Shape-Shifting Representation, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 723, 723
(2014) [hereinafter Shape-Shifting Representation] (describing how politicians stand for different
things to different people); see also infra Section II.A.
36
This is called the “legislative primacy” argument. For an example, see POSNER &
VERMEULE, supra note 13, at 8; and JEREMY WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, in POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY 196 (2016) [hereinafter The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review]. For a discussion of the historical intellectual roots of legislative
primacy and its relation to individual rights, see ANICETO MASFERRER & ANNA TAITSLIN, The
Ill-Fated Union: Constitutional Entrenchment of Rights and the Will Theory from Rousseau to
Waldron, in THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL STATE (RECHSSTAAT), 105–06, 112 (James E. Hickey & James R. Silkenat eds., 2014) (explaining, inter alia,
that Dicey believed in parliamentary supremacy and that the common law, enforced by judges,
30
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The non-delegation doctrine purports to prevent the delegation of something that
simply may not exist.
Critics commit another mistake when they invoke a theory of constitutionalism that
analytically divides functions that cannot, as either a moral or empirical matter, be
disentangled. First, they incorrectly posit two separate, autonomous processes: the collective formation of ends via law-making and the implementation, execution, application, or adjudication of those ends.37 But we cannot presume that judges and
administrators can mechanically apply and enforce the law without importing into the
process their own value-laden, and therefore political, judgments.38 “[T]hey who will
the end will the means” is a naïve argument that occludes the power wielded by
unelected actors.39 It is also a mistake to presume that the legislative branch concerns itself only with value-laden final ends, and not with the means required to
execute them.40 Indeed, most of our most bitter political fights are fights conducted
precisely over means: how best to grow the economy; how best to care for the sick;
how best to mitigate climate change, etc.41 As a result, the theories overemphasize
and distort the purpose of separating powers.42
Critics commit yet another mistake when they divorce the constitutional functions of (1) protecting rights and limiting government power, and (2) providing the
decision-making procedures necessary for democratic will-formation.43 They isolate
elections and law-making from the process of enforcing rights and the rule of law—as
if they have nothing to do with one another. Yet quarantining rights from democracy
requires reliance on an outsourced moral order external to the political system
itself—a reliance inappropriate for contemporary secular polities.44 They therefore
would adequately protect individual rights against arbitrary executive power and preserve
the “rule of law”).
37
RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 114 (dubs this phenomenon “agency instrumentalism”).
38
E.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897),
reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 997–98 (1997) (though most well-known for his “bad man”
theory of the law, the essay also argues that law cannot be applied using mechanical logic;
that “[b]ehind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of
competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and
yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding”).
39
RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 116.
40
See id. at 119–27.
41
Id. at 102.
42
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
43
See Habermas, supra note 32, at 8–9. For a recent exhaustive historical treatment of
how lawyers, judges, lawmakers, and advocates invoked the constitution as an agent of
popular law-making, rather than as a limit on popular power, see JOSEPH FISHKIN & WILLIAM
E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY CONSTITUTION (Harv. Univ. Press 2022).
44
Probably the most seminal argument is found in MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC
AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge 2001) (1930). See also
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968); JURGEN
HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 101–02 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1975);
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lend judges too many liberal credentials while denying any to mechanisms of
popular feedback.
Rather than critiquing agencies for violating the separation of powers, for their
over-reliance on unelected technocrats, or for their indifference to universalizable
legal principles, this Article argues that administration does indeed carry constitutional
liberal democratic credentials—credentials borne out by political theory’s “representative turn.”45 By understanding agencies as embedded in a system of representative
democracy that aims to set the conditions by which citizens can relate to each other
as political equals, we can assess the legitimacy of government agencies without any
“idolatrous” commitments to a fictitious popular sovereign or legal formalism.46 This
Article suggests that agency institutions should be measured against the notion that
popular sovereignty demands not consensus and consent, but instead institutions that
permit citizens to understand themselves as coequal participants in the collective
decision-making process.
Part I situates administrative agencies in an understanding of liberal democratic
constitutionalism that eschews outmoded notions of popular sovereignty and natural
law. It will then explain how adequately conceived notions of the separation of
powers and the rule of law cannot serve as indefeasible objections to administration.
Part II makes a positive case for agency authority by drawing from the insights gained
from political theory’s representative turn. It will first define this important intellectual development and then explain how administrative agencies might fit comfortably within a representative system. The Article concludes by showing how theories
of representation can inform some enduring debates in administrative law and
suggesting some changes that might enhance the legitimacy of agency action.
I. ADMINISTRATION, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS
Democracy promises the rule of “we the people.”47 Democratic citizens, possessing inalienable rights, are to come together, deliberate,48 and jointly create the
laws that bind them. The administrative agency, with its unaccountable expert technocrats, policymaking autonomy, and immunity from micromanaging judicial review,
looks like an unwelcome uncle at the constitutional dinner table.
Intuitively, these knee-jerk objections cannot be quite correct. Agencies carry
some obviously democratic credentials. As Adrian Vermeule points out, they are,
after all, the creation of statutory law-making.49 At least as early as 1798, Congress
cf. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 36 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (“All
significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.”).
45
Nadia Urbinati & Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation in Contemporary
Democratic Theory, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 387, 388–89 (2008).
46
VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 56.
47
See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 4 (1998); U.S.
CONST. pmbl.
48
Nathan K. Noh, Non-Delegation as Non-Deliberation, 19 N.Y.U. L. REV. 379, 394 (2016).
49
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 13, at 9.
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has delegated coercive rulemaking power to Federal bureaucracy on matters as diverse
as tax inspections, territorial governance, veterans’ pensions, mail delivery, intellectual
property, and the payment of public debts.50 In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme
Court interpreted the “necessary and proper” clause to anticipate Congress’ desire to
create such agencies—in this case, a national bank.51 Bruce Ackerman, in his seminal
work, argues that our contemporary agencies carry “constitutional” credentials.52
Many were birthed through multiple hyperpolitical elections and constitutional challenges within the courts.53 Further, from their very inception, agencies struggled
internally to accommodate their actions to constitutional requirements.54 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), for example, imposes upon agencies principles of due
process and the rule of law.55
Regardless, if democratic law-making is to shape the community of those that
make it, there must be some kind of agent or instrumentality to carry it out.56 A congressional decision to levy a tax is meaningless without an Internal Revenue Service
to collect it.57 Yet it is impossible to imagine that such agencies might operate like
mindless, loyal robots. Whether performed by court or administrator, the application
of laws will inevitably involve controversial policy judgments.58 Law-making is, by its
nature, always more abstract than we would like. Such “general propositions do not,”
noted Justice Holmes, Jr. in his influential Lochner v. New York59 dissent, “decide
concrete cases.” The required elaboration almost always imports values that are not
50

See generally Nicholas R. Parillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case against
Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real
Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J. 1288 (2021); Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley,
Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 332–49 (2021); Kevin Arlyck, The
Founders’ Forfeiture, 119 COLUM. L. REV 1449, 1452 (2019).
51
17 U.S. 316 (1819); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
52
ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 4–5.
53
Id. at 279–90, 306–12.
54
Sophia Z. Lee, Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from
the Founding to the Present, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1699, 1710–28 (2019).
55
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559; see, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the TwentyFirst Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438 (2003) [hereinafter Administrative Law in the
Twenty-First Century].
56
See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 212 (1887)
(describing administration as the “Deed” that follows democratic will); JURGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 134 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992) [hereinafter BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS].
57
See Parillo, supra note 50. Theodore Sedgwick also noted, in 1791, that though Article
I vested in Congress the right to coin money, “if no part of [Congress’] power be delegable, he
did not know but [Congressmembers] might be obliged to turn coiners, and work in the Mint
themselves.” 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 230–31 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
58
See infra at Section I.C; RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 116; Goodin, supra note 28,
at 238; Holmes, Jr., supra note 38, at 997–98.
59
198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
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clearly and unambiguously identified in any statutory text.60 The task of accommodating administration to constitutional democracy cannot, therefore, aim at eliminating the agency costs implicit in the application of law. It can only seek to understand
how they might comfortably fit within a constitutional order.
The next two sections will elaborate upon these intuitions. Many objections to
agency power presume antiquated conceptions of sovereignty and rights. They
juxtapose the will of a powerful organ-body sovereign61 against a governed mass of
subjects who hold an array of pre-political liberties that require judicial protection.
This all-powerful body is thought to be represented by Congress as the commissioned
agent or embodiment of the popular sovereign.62 To preserve citizens’ natural, prepolitical liberties, this agent of the popular sovereign is constrained by a separation
of powers, checks and balances, a Bill of Rights, etc.—each policed by independent
courts capable of identifying and enforcing citizens’ inalienable liberties.63 If this is
indeed the rubric of the liberal democratic constitutional state, it is difficult to see
how agencies pass constitutional muster. They are not Congress—and so their policymaking cannot be legitimate expressions of the popular will. They often avoid substantial judicial review, and so they might violate natural liberties with impunity.
Fortunately, this rubric is wrong.
A. The Mind and Body of the Democratic Sovereign
True, for much of modern Western history, sovereignty, understood as the
supreme, absolute and indivisible power to make law, was thought to be held by a
60

Holmes, Jr., supra note 38, at 997–98.
See Wilson, supra note 56, at 205 (juxtaposing democracy’s “corporate, popular will”
against the will of an autocrat); Mary E. Guy, Ties that Bind: The Link Between Public Administration and Political Science, 65 J. POL. 641, 642 (2003) (administration and law-making is
“the expression of the state will” and “the execution of the state will.”); Florida v. Becerra,
No. 8:21-cv-839-SDM-AAS, 2021 WL 2514138, at *36 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2021) (the Constitution is “the organic grant of power from the sovereign people and the sovereign states”).
62
E.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 13, at 8 (calling this idea “legislative primacy”).
Examples of arguments that use the idea of legislative primary include: George I. Lovell,
That Sick Chicken Won’t Hunt: The Limits of a Judicially Enforced Non-Delegation Doctrine,
17 CONST. COMMENT. 79, 85 (2000); Christiano, supra note 28, at 212; COX & RODRIGUEZ,
supra note 19, at 2; LOCKE, supra note 1, at 362 (ch. XI, ¶ 141); and Stewart, The Reformation
of Administrative Law, supra note 31, at 1672–73 (Legislative primacy “appears ultimately
to be bottomed on a contractarian political theory running back to Hobbes and Locke . . . .
Since the process of consent is institutionalized in the legislature, that body must authorize any
new official imposition of sanctions . . . . The requirement that agencies conform to specific
legislative directives . . . legitimates administrative action by reference to higher authority.”).
63
See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 13, at 1 (calling this idea “liberal legalism”); P.S.
ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, Legal Theories in England and America: 1776, in FORM
AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING,
LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 229–31 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987); see also JUDITH
SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 65 (Harv. Univ. Press 1986).
61
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specific body: the one wearing the crown.64 To constitute and justify public power,
Hobbes, for example, imagined a state of nature full of individuals authorizing and
relinquishing their natural liberties to a “Mortall God,”65 i.e., the modern corporate
state, represented (or re-presented) in the flesh-and-blood bodies of the king or
legislature.66 During the democratic revolutions, radical theorists67 merged the monarch
with her subjects.68 They imagined “the people” not only replacing the king as sovereign, but also governing itself as a subject, thereby creating an identity between ruler
and ruled. Rousseau’s volonté générale69 serves as a model for this kind of logic.70
Montesquieu, whose thinking influenced the American founders,71 likewise held that
“the people as a body . . . have sovereign power” in a republic.72 Even A.V. Dicey,
despite his fame as a rule of law scholar, believed that a representative legislature
would “produce coincidence between the wishes of the sovereign and the wishes of
the subjects.”73 It is a sovereign-subject hat trick: the ruled become the ruler, the democratic “people,” understood as a body, a “unitary macro-subject,”74 come to occupy
what was once occupied by the body of the king. Carl Schmitt likewise endorsed a
scrupulous identity between governed and governor—with homogenizing and fascist
64

E.g., JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 1–2 (Julian H. Franklin ed., trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1576);
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 18–19 (rev. ed. 2013).
65
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 227 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1651).
66
See generally Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State,
7 J. POL. PHIL. 1 (1999) (for an explanation of the corporate conception of the state as both
human and corporate (artificial) person); DANIEL LEE, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2016).
67
See LEE, supra note 66, at 4 (the conventional narrative of popular sovereignty couches
it as an idea of resistance).
68
E.g., MORGAN, supra note 64, at 87–88; MARGARET CANOVAN, THE PEOPLE 24–29
(Polity Press 2005). See generally RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2016).
69
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 192–95 (G.D.H.
Cole trans., Everyman 1993); cf. TUCK, supra note 68, at 3–5, 8–9 (arguing that Rousseau
and Bodin drew a sharp distinction between (popular) sovereign and government).
70
Nadia Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture: The Power of Judgment in Democratic
Representation, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 194, 203 (2005) [hereinafter Continuity and Rupture];
ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 76–77; Habermas, supra note 32, at 9; NANCY ROSENBLUM,
Holism, in ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP
29 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
71
E.g., PAUL M. SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 1760–1801 (1940).
72
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 10 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2011) (1748).
73
ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 81 (8th ed. 1931) (1885).
74
Andreas Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power, 12
CONSTELLATIONS 223, 224 (2005).
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implications.75 For Schmitt, it was impossible to imagine a leader speaking with the
voice of the people unless the people themselves first sang in perfect harmony.76
There are flaws in this equation. The “people,” understood literally, cannot rule.
They do not possess a primordial collective will existing outside and independent
of their political institutions.77 Moreover, the entire population of a diverse community of hundreds of millions cannot be present within those institutions. Nor can that
population ever find a unanimous general will, a non-controversial understanding
of the common good, no matter how constrained and qualified their public reasoning
or how universal and general its aspirations.78 Thus, no coherent popular will can
obtain even after undertaking the decision-making processes of political institutions.79
Just as the contractual “meeting of the minds” is a legal fiction of private law,80 a
75

CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 25–30, 32 (Ellen Kennedy
trans., 1988) (1923) [hereinafter THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY]; see, e.g.,
CANOVAN, supra note 68, at 74–77; ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 76; Kalyvas, supra
note 74, at 224; HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 57–58 (2d ed. 1998) (1958).
76
Cf. SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, supra note 75, at 6.
77
E.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT 167 (1995); JEREMY WALDRON,
Precommitment and Assurance, in LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 278 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999)
[hereinafter Precommitment and Assurance]; Lisa Disch, The End of Representative Politics?,
in THE CONSTRUCTIVIST TURN IN POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 10 (Lisa Disch et al. eds.,
2019) [hereinafter The End of Representative Politics?]; see, e.g., Saward, Shape-Shifting
Representation, supra note 35, at 315–16.
78
E.g., SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 18, at 8; FRANZ NEUMANN,
The Concept of Political Freedom, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE
160, 190 (Herbert Marcuse ed., 1957) (1953) [hereinafter The Concept of Political Freedom]
(Neumann is worth citing because he engaged contemporaneously with Schmitt’s work);
Habermas, supra note 32, at 10; JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 251–52 (Harper 3d ed. 2008) (1942); see also WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 43 (“It is probably a mistake for any branch of government
to assume the mantle of popular sovereign.”); id. at 77 (“I am inclined to say there is no such
thing as the people. There is just a large array of individual persons, millions of them . . . .
And there are innumerable ways of mapping onto that array another array, namely the five
or six hundred seats that there are in a given legislative assembly.”); id. at 180 (“There is no
reason why the theory of democratic accountability should be held hostage to any particular
political ontology—‘the people’ as a singular entity, the general will, the will of the people,
the majority, and so on.”); Nadia Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic
Deliberation, 28 POL. THEORY 758, 774 (2000) [hereinafter Representation as Advocacy]
(citing J.S. Mill, arguing that “[w]ith respect to the ‘identification of interest between the rulers
and the ruled,’ [Mill] assumed that such an identification could hardly exist; in fact, it did
not. If it did, representation, and perhaps government itself, would be unnecessary.”).
79
E.g., TUCK, supra note 68, at 5–8. This is perhaps why jurists like Dicey and Austin
separated the concepts of legal sovereignty and political sovereignty. Without a “will,” the
people cannot speak and act—literally—through their representatives. There is no feasible
way to merge the legal sovereignty exercised by rulers and the popular political sovereignty
enjoyed by the people. See MASFERRER & TAITSLIN, supra note 36, at 112 nn.36, 40.
80
See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV.
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popular “meeting of the minds” is a political fiction of public law. As a result,
despite the democratic revolutions, the old gap between ruler and ruled remains.81
In other words, the merger between governed and governor attempted by the democratic revolutions did not remove the danger of heteronomy,82 even if the offices of
government might be staffed by elected representatives and even as constitutional
systems split powers and limited legal authority.83 Some would wield public power,
and the rest would be subject to its rules. Even Rousseau downgraded the popular sovereign to a silent, passive actor that left the actual business of governing to functionaries.84 Like the client of a travel agent, Rousseau’s democratic citizen was meant
only to approve or disapprove the prepackaged plans presented by ministers.85
Law-making under constitutional liberal democracy is therefore not a question
of ascertaining the existence of some non-existent popular “will” to be left in the hands
of loyal fiduciaries in government86 to carry out like mindless automatons. Nor is it
comprised of the dictates of a caesarist leader purporting to speak with the unified
voice of the sovereign people.87 Instead, it is a question of developing transparent and
accessible collective decision-making procedures that ensure that all citizens can
understand themselves as equal participants in their collective ordering; that ordinary
people are involved in public life and have a say in their collective destiny.88 They
do not rule. Rather, they are equal players in the game of representative democracy.89
Thus, although contemporary notions of constitutional liberal democracy ascribe
the highest legitimate source of authority to “the people,” they do not understand
“the people” as a reified, homogenous whole with an identifiable will that pre-exists
1 (1894); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911)
(making a strong case for the objective theory of contract).
81
E.g., CANOVAN, supra note 68, at 28–29 (showing that the American founders, despite
their corporate notion of popular sovereignty, recognized a gap between elected legislators
and “the people”); Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 759.
82
DIETER GRIMM, SOVEREIGNTY: THE ORIGIN AND FUTURE OF A POLITICAL AND LEGAL
CONCEPT 31 (2015); CANOVAN, supra note 68, at 29; NEUMANN, The Concept of Political
Freedom, supra note 78, at 190.
83
MORGAN, supra note 64, at 53.
84
TUCK, supra note 68, at 5; LEE, supra note 66, at 5, 11.
85
Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70, at 207.
86
An example of this kind of thinking is found in LOCKE, supra note 1, at 367 (“[T]he
Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the
People a Supream Power.”) and in ROUSSEAU, supra note 69, at 235.
87
See ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON 159–60 (2005) (probably the most influential contemporary statement of this Schmittian notion); see also Arato, supra note 7, at
1111–12.
88
E.g., GRIMM, supra note 82, at 37, 73–74; Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra
note 70, at 215; GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION 19–20 (2009);
ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 181–82; HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra
note 56, at 132–33, 169.
89
See infra Part II.
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whatever governing apparatus might be laid atop it. Though “popular sovereignty”
is a political fiction, it is a useful one—at least if it is used as a standard of justification
and critique, not as a proper noun. It is an aspirational, regulative idea intended to
depersonalize and distribute public power in a way that serves the entire community.90 It is a Kantian “as if” principle.91 Namely, if we try to think like a popular
sovereign might think, if such a thing could ever exist, we will orient our public
reasoning not towards our individual self-interest alone, but in terms of inclusivity,
human equality and the public good.92 Because if the sovereign is a “we,” then
governing involves more than the interests and preferences of single individuals. We
will therefore demand that political institutions remain accountable and accessible
to popular complaints. We will adopt a Weberian politics of responsibility, remembering that our decisions might inflict unforeseen costs upon others.93
This figurative idea of popular sovereignty also unlocks the closed doors of
power and forces the inclusion of voices previously ignored.94 Whosoever happens
to be governing at any given time, that person is not “the people” precisely because
“the people” cannot ever be present. As a result, anyone denied an audience can
appeal to popular sovereignty as they seek admission to political decision-making.
Importantly, popular sovereignty demands, as French philosopher Claude Lefort
notes, that this place of power remain an empty one—or at least one with a revolving
door—where no body at all is permitted to rule permanently.95 For to fill that void
would allow for a part to speak on behalf of the whole. As political theorist Nadia
Urbinati notes “We the People” might become, “Me the People.”96 It would force
homogeneity upon plural societies as leaders with controversial viewpoints purport
to represent everyone as they make and implement policy. Moreover, the usurpation
of this space would undermine the depersonalization of power inherent in the idea
of a fictional popular sovereign and, importantly, the rule of law and not of men.97
If the place of power remains empty because all citizens contribute in some way to
law-making, then we can credibly claim that it is law, not our politicians, who rule.
As a result, it can be no objection to agency policymaking that it usurps authority
from the popular sovereign. Because if the people take popular sovereignty literally,
so, too, do elected representatives. They likewise cannot logically or credibly speak
with the voice of the sovereign people.98 Thus, insofar as theories of non-delegation
90

Habermas, supra note 32, at 9–10; LEE, supra note 66, at 14.
Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70, at 212–13.
92
Id. at 214.
93
See MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
41 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946) (1919).
94
CANOVAN, supra note 68, at 36.
95
LEFORT, supra note 34; see also LEE, supra note 66, at 15.
96
See generally NADIA URBINATI, ME THE PEOPLE: HOW POPULISM TRANSFORMS
DEMOCRACY (2019).
97
See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 136; ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 26.
98
E.g., ROUSSEAU, supra note 69, at 229 (sovereignty cannot be delegated).
91
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and legislative primacy rely on an organ-body theory of popular sovereignty,99 they
are misplaced. Attacks against the “technocratic” power wielded by administrative
officers may likewise overstate the democratic credentials of the Congressional legislation against which such power is compared—and found wanting. It is at least possible that administrative agencies can be made consistent with the requirements of
constitutional popular sovereignty.100 Namely, the question is whether and to what
extent they operate according to procedures that allow citizens to understand themselves
as coequal participants in shaping agency action. Finally, that independent administration is “headless” is not, as feared by contemporary New Deal critics, fascist or
totalitarian.101 It may in fact be a necessary precondition for liberal democracy. A
Leviathan with a single head with a single mouth, purporting to speak for all, can
be monstrous indeed.
B. Individual Rights and Rule of Law
Many objections to agency policymaking and adjudication do not emphasize
principles of legislative primacy and non-delegation. Instead, they take aim at administrative “particularism”102 and the risk it poses to individual liberty and the rule
of law. Though they prioritize the Constitution’s function as a check on power over
its function to constitute power,103 these critiques likewise rely on some sovereign
99

For examples of organ-body theory see supra note 36. Other examples may include
Lawson, POSTELL, and EPSTEIN, supra note 12. An organ body conception of legislative
primacy is also illustrated in Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion in Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Bus.
v. OSHA, 595 U.S. ____ , *2 (2022) (Gorsuch, concurring). According to the Court, Congress
is a body capable of a will; it can “speak clearly.” It is also sovereign: without its clear instructions, its agents cannot act. “[I]f [congress] wishes to assign to an executive agency decisions ‘of vast economic and political significance.’” (quoting Alabama Assn. of Realtors v.
Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (per curiam) (slip op.,
at 6)). According to Waldron, “[i]n liberal political theory, legislative supremacy is often
associated with popular self-government . . . .” WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 196.
100
As discussed infra at Part II, agencies might provide non-electoral forms of democratic
representation. See, e.g., Michael Saward, Authorisation and Authenticity: Representation
and the Unelected, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 1 (2009).
101
DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 86 (1980). LEFORT,
supra note 34, at 19, argues that, indeed, cutting of the head of the king—metaphorically and
literally—was necessary for democracy.
102
Objections to executive “particularism” appear in ROUSSEAU, supra note 69, at 229.
103
For example, HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 17, argues that “[c]onstitutional law developed in the seventeenth century primarily as a means of defeating the absolute prerogative.”
Cf., e.g., LEE, supra note 66, at 14 (explaining that popular sovereignty developed as a
concept not just to contest power, but to legitimately constitute it); WALDRON, The Core of
the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 23, 34, 284 (constitutions both constitute
and limit power; the former is not always emphasized sufficiently); id. at 297 (citing HANNAH
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 148, 154 (2006) (1963)). See also Gerald E. Caiden, In Search of
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authority legibus solutus. This time, though, it is rendered not as voluntas, the will
of a sovereign body, but instead as moral truth. Some libertarian critiques rest, explicitly or implicitly, on the idea of the “unwritten Constitution”104 which protects
an array of rationally discoverable pre-political liberties105 that were enshrined into
positive law by the Bill of Rights106 or guarded by the common law and its courts.107
Rights have an objective existence; therefore, all reasonable people can (or must)
consent to them. They accordingly should be identified and protected by impartial,
unelected specialist judges.108
Other critiques speak in the language of the rule of law. Lending “the rule of
law” a definition endorsed by Dicey and Coke, these critiques charge that because
agency rulemaking and adjudication occur outside judicial branch courts and
Congress, they risk exercising the same kind of absolute, arbitrary power wielded
by unelected Stuart and Tudor monarchs.109 Although couched in terms of black
letter constitutional doctrine, the underlying principles motivating this critique, like
libertarian rights-based arguments, rely on an idealized moral order that encourages
an Apolitical Science of American Public Administration, in POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION:
WOODROW WILSON AND AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 51, 55 (Jack Rabin & James
Bowman eds., 1984).
104
These arguments come in several forms. Some hold that the Constitution was never
meant to supplant pre-existing judicial power to protect fundamental rights, implicitly protected by principles like “the rule of law” and due process. E.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 7,
at 22. They can also come in through “inclusive” legal positivist arguments (e.g., RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 410 (Harv. Univ. Press 1986)) that hold that “outside” moral values
should guide judicial discretion. Id.
105
E.g., Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism about Corporate Rights,
in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 345, 353 (M. Schwarzman, C. Flanders &
Z. Robinson eds., 2016); FRANZ NEUMANN, Types of Natural Law, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND
THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 69, 89–90 (Herbert Marcuse ed., 1957) (1939); Douglas Sturm,
A Prospective View of the Bill of Rights: Towards a New Constitutionalism, 13 J.L. & RELIGION
27, 29–30 (1996).
106
THOMAS MCAFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS’ UNDERSTANDING (2000); NEUMANN, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 78, at 164; Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454,
457 (1909).
107
E.g., MASFERRER & TAITSLIN, supra note 36, at 112 (“According to Dicey, the common
law checked the state’s arbitrary power through the authority of judges.”). The role of the
common law in protecting “natural” rights is also observed in cases like Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), when “vested” common law property rights were given due process
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC
DEMOCRACY 63 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1985) [hereinafter A PREFACE].
108
Christopher Forsyth, Showing the Fly the Way out of the Flybottle, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
325, 331–32 (2007); HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 45. In his diagnosis of the unlawfulness of
administration, Hamburger explicitly relies on norms that transcend Constitutional legal doctrine and could be characterized as a natural law argument. See, e.g., id., at 15, 385, 493; see
also Lawson, The Rise and Rise, supra note 12, at 1529–31; Pound, supra note 106, at 457–59.
109
HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 35, 47.
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small government. This time, however, that moral order bootstraps itself to the democratic legitimacy provided by Congress.110 Emphasizing agencies’ irregular rulemaking,
they conjure the ghost of the Kantian social contract that, in its impartiality and generality, vindicates citizens’ equal negative liberty while protecting them from personal
tyrannical rule.111
According to this view, statutes should arise from a deliberative decision-making
procedure that effaces individual interest and consequently produces impersonal
rules that permit citizens significant freedoms.112 The law that rules over them
should be a “faceless order that aspires to be universal and eternal, after the example
of the divine, and equal to it, an order launched into space and into time, where an
anonymous crowd meets invisible generations.”113 In Justice Gorsuch’s language,
legislation should consist of “generally applicable rules of conduct governing future
actions by private persons.”114 If a legislature—Congress—is operating properly, it
should promulgate only a small number of abstract, rational and general laws
amenable to straightforward application by workmanlike and subordinate judicial
and executive bodies.115 It should, as Locke persuaded, “be conformable to the Law
110

Dicey, for example, embraced “parliamentary supremacy.” MASFERRER & TAITSLIN,
supra note 36, at 106. However, his rule of law arguments not aimed at limiting parliamentary
power so much as they were aimed at curtailing executive powers. Id. at 112.
111
ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 25–26; HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 23 (arguing
that “Lockean reasons about consent” “lurk[] not far below” the legitimacy of Congressional
law-making); see also id. at 50, 72; FRANZ NEUMANN, The Change in the Function of Law
in Modern Society, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 22, 25–26 (Herbert
Marcuse ed., 1957) (1937) [hereinafter The Change in the Function of Law]; WALDRON, The
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 153 (“[General legislation] presents
itself in the image of morality. . . . To make law [] is not just to exercise power; it is (so to
speak) to make a public morality for a particular community.”); Laurence Lustgarten, Socialism
and the Rule of Law, 15 J.L. & SOC’Y 25, 25 (1988); LOCKE, supra note 1, at 357, 363–64. An
example of this notion of the rule of (deliberative, congressional law) can be found in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
112
See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2134 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);
WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 17, 66.
113
ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 27 (quoting Jean Carbonnier, La passion des lois au
siècle des Lumières, in ESSAIS SUR LES LOIS 240 (Paris: Defrénois, 2d ed. 1995)); see also
NEUMANN, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 78, at 170; Noh, supra note 48,
at 394 (citing The Federalist’s references to impartial deliberation); Lawson, The Rise and
Rise, supra note 12, at 1531; HAYEK, supra note 13, at 12. An example of the antithesis of
the idea of “general law” is the ratemaking of the Progressive era. For a discussion of the
debate between Ernst Freud and Felix Frankfurter on the tension between general, abstract
law and “substantive justice,” see DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA 11–14 (2014).
114
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
115
NEUMANN, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 78, at 170 (“[T]he judge [is]
merely ‘the mouthpiece of the law,’ applying it through a logical process of subsumption.”);
see also, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, supra note 72, at 163; NEUMANN, The Change in the Function
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of Nature.”116 It would accordingly preserve freedom because it, as a real-life variety
of the Kantian117 social contract, could only settle on terms that maximized equal
(negative) liberty for all. This ideal is juxtaposed to profligate agency decision-making
that addresses specific actors in specific situations while addressing specific interests.
As under the natural law objection, agencies’ irregular adjudication of this law is likewise objectionable. Only expert judges committed to its neutral application will do.118
The rule of law objection therefore often follows the same logic as the natural
rights and popular sovereignty objections: there is an unambiguous, pre-constitutional
normative framework—the popular sovereign, operating rationally through the social
contract to generate objectively good “general legislation”—that should be straightforwardly applied by expert judges in order to constrain executive action. For Franz
Neumann, a critical contemporary of Carl Schmitt and associated with the Frankfurt
School,119 this notion of the rule of law “is really a disguised revival of natural law
which is now fulfilling counterrevolutionary functions”120—despite its ostensibly democratic, secular pedigree. Both the natural rights and rule-of-law variants of this
objection to administration conceive the law as something general, simple, self-evident,
derived or derivable from the rational consent of the governed, and amenable to
non-controversial application to real-life particularities. This conception is mistaken.
First, rights, whether legal or natural, are never so clear and unambiguous that
they are capable of application without controversy. The Legal Realist critique121 of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shows convincingly that the law is
often in- or under-determinate122 and therefore judicial elaboration and application
of that law commonly amounts to a political choice—a choice that should not be
left in the hands of politically unaccountable judges.123 As a result, privileging
of Law, supra note 111, at 29–38; ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 29; FRANK GOODNOW,
POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 24–25 (1900); M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 23 (1967) (citing Aristotle’s ETHICS V (10) and POLITICS III (16)).
116
LOCKE, supra note 1, at 369.
117
NEUMANN, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 111, at 33–34.
118
VILE, supra note 115, at 22–23; HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 38, 82.
119
Founded at the Goethe University Frankfurt during the Weimar Republic, this school
critiqued capitalism, fascism, and Marxism-Leninism. It is a home of the intellectual “New
Left.” Members include, e.g., Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Raymond
Guess, and Jurgen Habermas. See FRANZ NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, ix–x (2009).
120
Id. at 53; NEUMANN, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 111, at 89.
121
This critique is addressed in a little more detail in the next section.
122
CASS SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN: REDEEMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 112 (2020); Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism
Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278, 295–96 (2001).
123
WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 232 (“At
most, the abstract terms of the Bill of Rights are popularly selected sites for disputes about [about
individual and minority rights].”). For a recent discussion of the questionable expertise of judges
when it comes to protecting not only minority rights, but also democratic political rights, see
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Article III judges as the guardians of liberty may simply swap one unpopular sovereign for another.
Second, contemporary economic and social conditions frustrate the basic ethical
claims of both natural rights and the rule of the law. Each targets the protection of equal
liberty. Yet applying both to corporate capitalist society often leads to unfreedom and
domination.124 Concurrently with the Legal Realists, Neumann showed that the ideal
of liberal parliamentarism—general law-making—was not for monopolistic capitalism
and wage labor, but for the bourgeois, competitive and egalitarian market utopias
imagined by Adam Smith and John Locke.125 “The postulate that the state should rule
only by general laws,” quips Neumann, “becomes absurd in the economic sphere if the
legislator is dealing not with equally strong competitors but with monopolies which
reverse the principle of the free market.”126 Because the private power of big business
impacts the public in a unique way, “the state can only regulate [via] individual
measures” if it is to achieve substantive social and political equality.127 Meanwhile,
critical scholars demonstrated that the law could never cash out its promise of equal
liberty if it dealt with citizens as abstract subjects, not as concrete individuals in all
their diversity.128 Instead, to vindicate citizens’ equal rights in a complex, unequal and
changing society, government must inevitably eschew what Rosanvallon dubs “the twin
cults of law and democratic impersonality”129 and instead embrace the particularism
liberals once associated with despotism.130 It must treat differences differently.
Third, and relatedly, legislation cannot, and usually does not, achieve a politically noncontroversial and equality-protecting generality. According to Neumann,
a society riven by intractable class conflict and amalgamations of private economic
power could never unanimously consent to any ostensibly rational general law.131
generally Ryan Doerfler and Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, 75 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3970932_.
124
E.g., JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1999) (1935); Pound, supra note
106, at 484; Thomas Hill Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, in WORKS
OF THOMAS HILL GREEN (Vol. II, 2011); Karl Marx, Capital. Vol. I, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 294, 343 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1867).
125
NEUMANN, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 111, at 39–40.
126
Id. at 52.
127
NEUMANN, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 78, at 171–72.
128
E.g., William E. Scheuerman, Recent Frankfurt Critical Theory: Down on Law?, 24
CONSTELLATIONS 113, 121–22 (2017) (describing the work of Axel Honneth); Lustgarten,
supra note 111, at 30. The current Court’s conservative wing embraces this one-sided understanding of constitutional power in Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Bus. v. OSHA, 595 U.S. __, *2 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (In comparing the plenary power of state and local governments to federal
law-making, Gorsuch argues that “[n]ot only must the federal government properly invoke
a constitutionally enumerated source of authority . . . . It must also act consistently with the
Constitution’s separation of powers”).
129
ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 41.
130
Id. at 65–66.
131
NEUMANN, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 78, at 168.
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As a result, whatever law-making results from Congress, it is not what the liberal
parliamentarians hoped it might be: universal rules whose application guarantees
equal liberty and the public good.132 Contemporary works on deliberative democracy, along with critiques of Rawlsian notions of justice, support the point.133 True
universality requires the incorporation of all marginalized voices—a utopia rarely
achieved under conditions of material, social, and cultural inequality.134
Natural rights face a similar fate. As Weber diagnosed, the great problem of
secular modernity is our lack of confidence in any outsourced, transcendental moral
authority.135 Contemporary liberalism admits the fact that there can be no authoritative notion of moral truth. It therefore quarantines the question, holding instead that
the only legitimacy a governing authority can ever hope to claim derives from a
Rawlsian “overlapping consensus” regarding the norms according to which diverse
people can arrange their collective life peaceably together.136 This overlapping consensus remains, however, more aspirational than real. No longer can we reach to
superordinate natural law or social contract theories for instruction. Our social fate
is one of ineluctable conflict, dissensus, and plurality.
Finally, these critiques of administration envision a constitution whose purpose
is primarily the limitation and division of the regrettable-but-inexorable presence of
state power.137 Rather than empower legitimate decision-making, these critics would
hamstring collective action by binding it to an outsourced moral ordering: pre-political
natural rights, a primordial common law of “vested” rights, or a rational, epistemic
conception of the “general will” that coheres with a deregulatory economic policy.
Yet the Constitution is better understood as more than a check on power. It also aims
to constitute legitimate power by giving citizens an equal say in forming collective
political life, thereby cashing out the promise of popular sovereignty.138 Focusing
exclusively on its power-checking features thus focuses only on one side of the coin.
132

Id.
See generally, e.g., HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 56, at 128–29,
454; SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL
ERA (Princeton Univ. Press 2002); Rainer Forst, The Justification of Human Rights and the
Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive Approach, 120 ETHICS 711 (2010); IRIS M. YOUNG,
INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 727–30 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
134
See generally YOUNG, supra note 133, at 715.
135
MAX WEBER, Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 86 (E.A. Shils & H.A. Finch, eds. & trans., 1949) (1904).
136
E.g., WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at
244–45. For a discussion of this constructivist account of rights in relation to administration,
see EMERSON, supra note 16, at 13.
137
See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 46 (“[C]onstitutional law developed in the
seventeenth century precisely to bar extralegal power.”).
138
See, e.g., LEE, supra note 66; HOLMES, supra note 77; Habermas, supra note 32, at 2;
WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 34; Edward
Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 370 (1989).
133
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The roadblocks offered by these objections to administration can be overcome
if one accepts a democratic constructivist account of rights. It is an account that holds
that rights and democracy are co-original.139 Namely, it is an account that holds that
citizens should participate in the creation of the legal rights they give themselves.140
The construction of rights depends upon a decision-making process that attempts to
cash out the promise of equal human worth—while always remaining subject to
critique along the same terms. Rights therefore begin as abstract concepts,141 and,
in their most inchoate form, they are a right to have equal rights.142 They are articulated and elaborated by historical democratic polities whose law-making institutions
are, hopefully, oriented towards cashing out the promise of equal liberty as citizens
themselves understand it.143 Rights result from social movements that emerge within
civil society and are then provisionally codified within the law through regular,144
constitutional and extra-constitutional procedures.145 Their content remains contingent and always within the grasp of democratic citizens.146 Whatever resolution may
temporarily arrive, uncertainty about both future factual circumstances and normative commitments precludes any final answer.147 Consequently, the abstract rights
that democratic practice concretizes are not indefeasible principles so much as
“mode[s] of problematisation” calling for democratic negotiation and discourse.148
This uncertainty, and the humility it implies, is no bad thing. For to settle on the
truth about their content would mean relinquishing political sovereignty into the
139

HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 56, at 128–29.
Id. has the seminal statement of co-originality. Id. (“The principle of discourse can assume
the shape of a principle of democracy through the medium of law only insofar as the discourse
principle and the legal medium interpenetrate and develop into a system of rights that brings
private and public autonomy into a relation of mutual presupposition.”) (emphasis in original).
141
E.g., WEBBER, supra note 88, at 1; SEYLA BENHABIB, Democratic Iterations, in
ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 50–55 (2006) (giving an example: how religious liberty and
state neutrality were interpreted in France following the headscarf controversy). Democratic
discourse thus contains meta-ideals of equality and liberty. In other words, liberal constitutional democracy relies on an abstract a priori concept of equal moral worth.
142
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296–97 (1st ed. 1951).
143
See supra text accompanying note 141.
144
See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J.
408, 412, 424 (2007) (arguing that many important rights are codified via statutory law).
145
JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1994) (theorizing the creation of rights through social movements); ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 99–119,
160–87 (describing the extra-constitutional creation of the Reconstruction amendments).
146
NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED 17 (2014); WEBBER, supra note 88, at 38,
147–48.
147
See DEWEY, supra note 124, at 21–22, 30–31 (tracing the changing meanings of liberalism in regards to economic life); Pound, supra note 106 (describing the historical and theoretical
contingency of the right to contract).
148
James Tully, The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of
Constitutional Democracy, 65 MOD. L. REV. 204, 207 (2002).
140
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hands of something else entirely—namely, someone who claims special expertise
about the correct interpretation of rights.149
Meanwhile, the equal liberty promised by an impersonal rule of law150 is perhaps
better vindicated through a law-making process that affords citizens not equal subjection to the same general law, but instead an equal role in the creation of a legal
system.151 Sometimes, the promise of equality and non-domination is best protected not
by rational, abstract and general rules but by democratic procedures that allow citizens
to speak for themselves about what equal liberty means to them.152 By incorporating
universality and reflexivity into the process of public deliberation,153 rather than into
the law’s substantive content, democratic polities can ensure the place of power remains empty, a place where laws—not men—rule.154 But it is a place that can also
respond to diversity and difference with particular and specific legislation. They need
not be general in substance if they are the co-creation of the general population.
There is good reason to believe that American citizens and jurists can and do
accept a constructivist account of rights. Indeed, they have demonstrated as much
by politicizing and modifying their liberties throughout its history. The right to privacy, ostensibly found under the “penumbra” of the Bill of Rights, is one obvious
example.155 The history of economic freedom provides another. After a Supreme
Court majority endorsed “natural” property and contract rights for the first time in
Allegeyer v. Louisiana,156 these Lochner157-era, laissez-faire economic freedoms
crumbled fifty years later in the face of democratic pressure.158 Couched as “vested”
149

E.g., URBINATI, supra note 146, at 17.
E.g., Scheuermann, supra note 128, at 121; Roger Cotterrell, The Rule of Law in Corporate Society: Neumann, Kirchheimer and the Lessons of Weimar, 51 MOD. L. REV. 126,
130 (1988) (for Neumann, the “ethical minimum” promised by the rule of law is a “promise
of equality, if only formal equality before the law”); VILE, supra note 115, at 25 (rule of law
means, inter alia, “justice for equals”).
151
For example, WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note
36, at 153, speaks of the attractiveness of the rule of law—or general legislation—because
it purports to impose rule “for reasons” like impartiality and “treating like cases alike” rather
than “arbitrarily or on a whim.” “Generality,” he notes, “connotes reciprocity.” These reasons
can be an attribute of the law itself—or of the process by which it is made. One example of this
“procedural” understanding of the rule of law is provided by Rubin, supra note 138, at 378–80
and ERNST, supra note 113, at 27–29 (describing how Charles Evans Hughes thought that
“rule of law” in agencies could be accomplished if they adopted judicial procedures).
152
E.g., Young, supra note 144.
153
See, e.g., Forst, supra note 133, at 712.
154
The phrase “empire of laws and not of men” is credited to James Harrington. PHILIP
PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 173 (2011).
155
JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM 64, 6971 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2004).
156
165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
157
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
158
Pound, supra note 106, at 457–64.
150
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and “unenumerated” protections for Lockean “fruits of labor,”159 natural rights theories
underwrote judicial awards of Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment protections
to business corporations.160 But American Progressives successfully challenged this
jealous defense of the market.161 By President Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union
Address,162 a proposed second bill of social rights provided justification for an
expanded social welfare state—the state that anti-administravists now challenge.
Thus, agencies cannot be dismissed as illegitimate because courts forsake their
duty to expertly police agencies’ treatment of citizens’ natural liberties. Courts hold
no monopoly on the interpretation of rights because they are not things that they can
“discover” as experts on natural law.163 Nor can agency regulation be dismissed as
illegitimate violations of the rule of law, because Congress does not create abstract,
general, universal impersonal laws whose formal application promises to vindicate
equal liberty and nonarbitrariness. It is at least possible that when the EEOC elaborates on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, as articulated by civil rights
statutes and informed by social movements and NGOs, it takes part in a systemic
process of democratic rights-construction that does permit citizens to understand
themselves as coequal authors of the rights that protect them.164
C. The Non-Problem of Separating Powers
If these arguments are correct, they challenge a separation of powers doctrine
that (1) juxtaposes a sovereign law-making body against; (2) an executive that robotically carries out its general will, all subject to; (3) an expert judiciary that mechanically
159

Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 90 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of the relation between common law and natural rights, see LEE, supra note 66, at 289 (in
England, the common law is a legal order without a legislator).
160
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553 (1852); DAHL, A PREFACE, supra
note 107, at 63; ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES
WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 159 (2018); William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern
American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 255 (A. Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
161
MARC A. EISNER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
OF MARKET AND STATE 34 (2011) (citing the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank and Federal
antitrust regulation).
162
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Jan. 11,
1944), http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/address_text.html.
163
Landis, supra note 29, at 535. Nor, as Waldron argues, are they suited to do so.
WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 222. Many of
their debates over rights involve constitutional doctrinal matters that are tangential to the major
moral issues at play.
164
See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1923
(2013) [hereinafter Administrative Constitutionalism] (agencies may have a better understanding of how laws impact pregnant citizens and can therefore better articulate the nondiscrimination principles); EMERSON, supra note 16, at 13 (progressives theorized administration
in way that contributed to democratic public reason).

2022]

ALL THE SOVEREIGN’S AGENTS

799

applies that will while policing it for rights violations.165 The loss of this doctrinal
understanding should not be mourned. Certainly, there are good instrumental reasons
to separate powers in a system of checks and balances. But commitment to the
separation of powers as an end in itself, rather than as a means, is, as Vermeule points
out, a kind of idolatry.166
First, the doctrine is a device whose functions have changed as social circumstances and values have changed.167 Notably, it was not always conceived as a way
to hamstring government, but instead to empower it. The concept, according to
Adam Smith, “seems originally to have risen from the increasing business of society,”168 not so much to limit power as it efficiently divided the labor of governing.
It permits collective decision-making to benefit from specialization and “a more
efficient distribution and organization of governmental functions.”169 Second, and
more recognizably, it is but one of several useful instruments that can help achieve
an end: the obstruction of excessive concentrations of power.170 Madison admitted
that it was a mere “auxiliary” device, an “invention of prudence” that could help
“control the abuses of government,” and that, though it was helpful, elections “[are],
no doubt, the primary control on the government.”171
Those committed to the rule of law generally and the Constitution’s articulation
of powers specifically may balk at the contingency implicated in this instrumental
conception. But as a matter of logic, the functions of government—law-making, judging, and executing—cannot be separated.172 Human reason simply cannot be divided
up so cleanly. Decision-making, whether performed by a state or an individual, can
never be entirely divorced into executive means and legislative ends. Or, put more
philosophically, purposive-rational action (instrumental reasoning) and communicative
165

NEUMANN, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 78, at 166; see also Mortenson
& Bagley, supra note 50, at 314–15 (describing how the Founders and their intellectual contemporaries likewise embraced this stylized tripartite structure and analogized the “body
politic” with the individual human body); Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note
78, at 758, notes that one of the reasons why we tend to favor direct, participatory democracy
to “indirect” representative democracy is because it “entails a fusion between ‘talking’ and
‘doing’ in political action.” Representation necessarily entails a separation between decision
and action. But it is important, she argues, not to overstate this separation.
166
VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 56.
167
VILE, supra note 115, at 17–18.
168
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 556 (Mgmt. Lab’y Press 2008) (1776).
169
HOLMES, supra note 77, at 164.
170
Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433
(2013). But see WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 50
(itemizing instrumental reasons for separating powers, including, e.g., providing multiple points
of contestation for government action and preventing domination by any single individual).
171
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
172
E.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 749–52 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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action (moral reasoning) cannot, pace Habermas,173 be so neatly dissected. When we
act, we update our ends as we consider the means required to achieve them. We
select some ends precisely because they are means for other ends.174 Administrative
agents, like individual agents, will inevitably face the same kind of decisions.175 “In
politics as in ordinary life,” political theorist Yves Sintomer notes, “judgments and
will are part of action, which encompasses [them both].”176 Any differentiation
between legislative, executive, and the adjudicative reasoning, therefore, is “sociologically naïve” at worst; dialogical and endogenous, at best.177
The conceptual elisions only increase when moving from an individual level
analysis to the state. Laws, the ends set by the legislature, necessarily contain some
amount of abstraction.178 Such abstraction invites an admixture of government
functions. The product of compromise and consensus-building amongst elected
representatives, they are full of open, inclusive language.179 Even cumbrous spending statutes, weighed down by log-rolls and pork barrels, speak in terms of abstract
“interest groups” and not specific individuals.180 “No legislature or legislative body,”
observed Frank Goodnow, “can express the will of the state as to all matters of
human conduct so clearly that no dispute as to its meaning may arise.”181 It was a
sentiment he shared with James Madison. In The Federalist Papers, Madison admitted that even when laws are “penned with the greatest technical skill,” their
meaning would remain “obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”182 Indeed,
173

See HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 81–82.
Adrian Blau, Defending Instrumental Rationality against Critical Theorists, 74 POL. RSCH.
Q. 1067, 1070 (2021); HAYEK, supra note 13, at 9; RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 119–27.
175
RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 118; DAHL, A PREFACE, supra note 107, at 3; Caiden,
supra note 103, at 64, 70.
176
Yves Sintomer, Nadia Urbinati’s “Democracy Disfigured” and the Crisis of Real
Existing Democracies, 15 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 230, 232 (2016).
177
Id.
178
See WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 138–40
(citing NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES AND GENEALOGY
(2006)); Frank Lovett, A Republican Theory of Adjudication, 21 RES PUBLICA 1, 4 (2015)
(citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 56–88 (G. E. M. Anscombe
trans. 1958)).
179
WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 138–40.
For philosophical explanation of law’s generality, see HAYEK, supra note 13, at 11–12; VILE,
supra note 115, at 26; RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 119; SHKLAR, supra note 63, at 29–38;
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (1961); ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 86, 135;
Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, supra note 31, at 1684; A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529–30 (1935).
180
WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 138–39.
181
GOODNOW, supra note 115, at 72.
182
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison); see also Mortenson & Bagley, supra note
50, at 315 (citing id.).
174
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Congress must incorporate some vagueness into its legislation if it is to capture the
future behavior of innovative business actors. Antitrust law, for example, cannot
effectively target future firm behavior if it specifies beyond the “unreasonable” restraint of trade. Adaptable organizations will find a way to skirt rigid rules.183
When they apply relatively abstract rules to address life’s particularities, courts
and agencies will inevitably interpret and elaborate.184 They will likewise confront
ambiguity when they find themselves applying old law to new and unforeseen
cases.185 In such interpretation and elaboration, value-laden policy choices will be
made—choices that at least flirt with the legislative, ends-focused reasoning.186 As
a result, state organs will employ conflicting canons of interpretation that are ripe
for politicization precisely because they rely on values that are not themselves
identified within the relevant statute.
True, scholars and courts may evade the separation of powers problem by
couching all sorts of rulemaking behavior as “non-legislative” because it derives
from an “intelligible principle”187 provided by Congressional statute.188 As a result,
it’s hoped that neither executive agencies nor the courts act as lawmakers as they
interpret, elaborate upon, and apply that principle. As Mortenson and Bagley point
out though, this move simply substitutes a judge’s reasonably contestable opinion
about which language is sufficiently certain to be “intelligible.”189 “Almost any
statute could conceivably flunk a text that mushy,”190 and a court could then step in
as lawgiver. At the same time, the legislative character inherent to the application
and execution of law is accepted by progressive and conservative legal scholars
alike.191 Samuel Moyn observes, for example, that “[a]ny interpretation of law is a form
of rule, and there is no way—contrary to what many of the founders believed—of
disentangling ‘judgment’ and ‘will.’”192 For Legal Realists, because the law is rationally under-determinate, the available legal reasons to which a court might appeal
when justifying its decisions will at least occasionally fail to offer a uniquely correct
outcome.193 Although the Constitution may not “enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s social
183

NEUMANN, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 78, at 172; see also PETTIT,
supra note 154, at 175–76 (such discretion need not unduly risk arbitrariness if other constraints are available).
184
NEUMANN, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 78, at 171; see also, e.g.,
Moyn, supra note 21; Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 164, at 1923.
185
SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note 122, at 111.
186
See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 122, at 295; Holmes, Jr., supra note 38, at 99798.
187
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
188
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2103–09 (2004).
189
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 50, at 287.
190
Id.
191
Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV.
389, 399 (1987).
192
Moyn, supra note 21.
193
Leiter, supra note 122, at 284 (citing Carl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
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statics,”194 outside values inevitably wend their way into case law. Vermeule, for his
part, points out that “the power to fill in the details [of legislation] is an indispensable
element of what ‘executive’ power means.”195 None other than Carl Schmitt recognized the legislative power exercised in the moment of the inevitably discretionary
interpretation and application of the law. He recognized it and then weaponized it to
legitimize a demagogic Nazi executive.196 If execution is political, it should be made
by the political actor that speaks with the voice of “the people.” At the other end of
the ideological spectrum, libertarian Philip Hamburger notes that “almost all legislation” “must apply to facts that cannot be known at the time of enactment.”197 Unlike
Schmitt, though, he insists, without much conceptual argumentation, that the “discernment” required during the law’s application is not an exercise of legislative will.
Instead, the acts of expounding and interpreting are mere functions that ought to be
allocated to the judiciary.198
Thus, the judicial branch inevitably finds itself engaging in both execution and
legislative policymaking. “Before the rise of administration,” notes legal historian
Daniel Ernst, “the courts had been the nation’s de facto regulators, and they had left
to juries the work of applying vague [legislative] standards.”199 For example, judges
went about the piecemeal business of utility rate-setting until the task was given to
administrators to execute.200
Likewise, Congressional policymaking cannot extricate itself from execution and
particularity.201 Else, the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause,202 empowering
Congress to create the laws needed to execute its powers, would have no purpose.203
As exemplified by the three-hundred-page CARES Act204 “[m]aking laws [has]
Appellate Decision, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950)); SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note
122, at 110 (noting that this critique of the separation of powers correlated with the Realists’
support for an expanded administrative state); see also Goodin, supra note 28, at 238.
194
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
195
VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 52–53.
196
SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 18, at 21.
197
HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 97.
198
Id. at 52.
199
ERNST, supra note 113, at 14.
200
Landis, supra note 29, at 530.
201
ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 57; GOODNOW, supra note 115, at 20; Waldron, The
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 133; Rubin, supra note 138, at
389–90.
202
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
203
See McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, supra
note 12, at 346–50; Merrill, supra note 188, at 2129–30 (suggesting that the blending of means
and ends within Congressional powers may underpin the Courts’ indifference regarding whether
agencies choose to undertake their activities under either rulemaking or adjudication); SUNSTEIN
& VERMEULE, supra note 122, at 55.
204
See generally The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No.
116-13 (2020).
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become just another means of governing.”205 There’s a good reason why Congress
concerns itself with implementation. For any given end, a variety of means will be
available to fulfill it, each implicating different values and preferences.206
Nor can Congress quarantine itself from the adjudication of conflicting demands
according to higher principle. As Madison noted long ago, much of law-making
amounts to the resolution of multiparty disputes amongst citizens alleging conflicting
claims.207 Bentham, argued that Parliament, like a common law adversary court,
hosted opposing arguments while the people themselves would sit as observing
judges.208 The laws passed by legislatures, like the opinions of courts, are often
elaborations and interpretations of higher, pre-existing principles.209 This is the very
model of the deliberative assembly. Political theorist Nadia Urbinati, in an important
2000 essay,210 describes elected representatives as advocates, pleading the case of
their constituents before a tribunal for their judgment.
To be sure, early scholars of administration law believed that politics and
administration—will and its execution—could be cleanly separated. Channeling
Rousseau and Condorcet, Wilson and his students hoped that administrators could
invoke “nomothetic,” or law-like, principles that would permit them to turn administration into some kind of hard science.211 Scholars of political philosophy are also
accustomed to the line drawn between instrumental and substantive reasoning
implied by a clean separation of powers.212 Yet their hopes are belied by reality.
Indeed, some of the most politically contentious debates are those over means,
not ends. For example: how different executives choose to exercise their “utterly
ordinary constitutional duty” to enforce immigration legislation.213 As citizens
debate the merits and demerits of border walls, child separations, and the deportation
of young undocumented immigrants, Congress may very well find itself considering
205

ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 57.
RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 123.
207
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“With equal, nay with greater reason, a body
of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most
important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the
rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the
different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine?
Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties
on one side and the debtors on the other.”).
208
Jeremy Bentham, Essay on Political Tactics (1791), in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 310 (John Bowring ed., 1865).
209
VILE, supra note 115, at 27; HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 78–79.
210
Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 773.
211
Caiden, supra note 103, at 51.
212
E.g., HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 85 (arguing that instrumental reasoning is ill-suited for democratic discourse because it “is immanently [a
discourse] of control”); CHIARA CORDELLI, THE PRIVATIZED STATE 85–86 (2020).
213
COX & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 19, at 2.
206
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new legislation delimiting the tools available to the Presidency. No one can reasonably doubt the political contentiousness of tax cuts and deficit spending, yet both are
means to achieve the same result: economic growth.214 Electoral politics, like agency
politics, likewise finds itself grappling with “the battle of the experts.” Citizens commonly clash not over their final ends, but how they are best achieved: how to grow
the economy, lift people from poverty, and decrease crime.215 Meanwhile, political
associations fail if they fail to find the means that can meet challenges to their
security and capacity.216 Elected leaders find themselves negotiating the constraints
of international financial markets and capital flows.217 As Dahl notes, democracy, if
it is to make intelligent choices in a complex society, “require[s] both technical understanding and sensitivity to the values involved.”218
As a result, those that attack independent administrative agencies as usurping
powers properly belonging to the judicial, executive, or legislative branches often
make a category mistake. None of these branches can possibly enjoy a monopoly on
the functions of legislation, adjudication, and execution. Folding administration into
any one of these branches will inevitably create another separation-of-powers
problem as they will bring with them all the powers they presently wield. Giving the
president more control over the Environmental Protection Agency means giving him
power to promulgate pollution regulation and adjudicate superfund claims at the
expense of Congress and the Courts. Folding agencies into the Courts by hamstringing their discretion merely swaps some bureaucrats for others.219 Instead of civil
servants, judges will be making the policy.
Rather, a critique based upon the separation of powers should derive from the
important purposes that it is meant to fulfill: non-domination, accountability, efficiency,
etc. And agencies have responded to such critiques by, for example, adopting the
due process and accountability norms set forth in the APA.220 Independent, professionalized and capable agencies both curb arbitrary presidential power and enable
the state’s constitutional obligation to govern.221 Arguably, it is the independence of
agencies against presidential power that curbed many of the Trump Administration’s
214

STEPHEN TURNER, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 3.0: CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF EXPERTS
4 (2003).
215
Id.; Peter Vervosek, Public Intellectuals and Experts Cannot Tell Citizens What to Do,
LSEBLOG (Jan. 28, 2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/01/28/public-intellectuals-and
-experts-cannot-tell-citizens-what-to-do/ [https://perma.cc/HR94-P5DH].
216
See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
217
Streeck, supra note 7, at 1314; John Pocock, The Political Limits of Premodern Economics, in THE ECONOMIC LIMITS OF MODERN POLITICS 121 (1990).
218
Robert Dahl, Social Reality and “Free Markets”, DISSENT MAG., Spring 1990, at 224,
227 [hereinafter Social Reality].
219
SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note 122, at 37; Landis, supra note 29, at 530.
220
ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 279–90, 306–12.
221
Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 7, at 7.
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abuses.222 In the next section, this Article details another norm that can be used to
assess the legitimacy of agencies: democratic representation. By offering additional
fora for representative input and contestation, they help a political regime better
vindicate the promise of popular sovereignty: that citizens can play an equal part in
forming the laws that govern them.
II. AGENCIES AND THE REPRESENTATIVE TURN
With a better understanding of popular sovereignty, rights, and the separation
of powers, critics of the administrative state cannot make a failsafe argument against
agencies’ legitimacy. Simply, they cannot rely on agencies’ lack of Congressional
input and immunity from judicial review. Here, this Article sets forth not a negative
defense of administration. Instead, it makes out a positive case. Namely, if agencies
operate according to procedures that permit citizens to understand themselves as
coequal political participants, it is at least possible that they are compatible with
constitutional liberal democracy. Recent conceptual work in political representation
bears out this possibility. It also shows how agencies might improve citizens’ ability
to participate equally in collective decision-making. As a result, administration may
not be the Constitution’s embarrassing uncle after all. It might instead prove indispensable to the fulfillment of constitutional democracy’s promises.
A. Defining the Turn
Democratic representation implies difference. If “the people” actually existed
as a homogenous whole with an identifiable will, there would be no need for a
multi-member mediating body of partisans.223 A single demagogue would do.224 If
“the common good” or “natural right” were easily ascertained, there would be no
need for a legislature to argue about it incessantly. A philosopher king would serve
more easily.225 Indeed, organ-body sovereignty, natural right and the “rule of general
222

Tim Wu, What Really Saved the Republic from Trump?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/opinion/trump-constitution-norms.html [https://perma
.cc/U3JR-FG9D].
223
E.g., ROSENBLUM, supra note 70, at 6.
224
CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 46–48 (G. Schwab trans., 2007);
SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, supra note 75, at 8–17, 28–32; CARL
SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 264–67 (J. Seitzer trans., 2008).
225
Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 774 (citing J.S. Mill, Rationale
of Representation, in ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 16–45, 22–23 (1977)); ROSENBLUM,
supra note 70, at 11 (noting, inter alia, that a “party to end parties is the pose of utopian and
revolutionary parties” like Jacobins and Communists), 27–28 (“Holism is antipolitical, and
holist utopias make this vivid. In every perfectionist community, the absence of political
institutions is the ideal. . . . Thus philosophical creators of utopia prescribe anarchy or technical
superintendence . . . . [t]wo holist assumptions dictate aversion to politics and therefore to
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law” imply a utopianism that can be vindicated in a plural society only through
force. Accordingly, if there are any theories of democratic political legitimacy that
might avoid these conceptual blunders, it would likely be found within theories of
democratic representation.
And so, it is. The representative, or “constructivist,” turn within political theory226
pushed back against the idea that representative democracy is merely a watereddown version of direct democracy, a pragmatic or elitist alternative to enlist only
when the demos is too unwieldy or too ignorant for more direct institutions.227 For
a long time, democratic theorists like James Madison, Joseph Schumpeter, and
Giovanni Sartori held that elections were a second-best way of ascertaining the “will
of the people,” adopted only because incorporating the will of each and every citizen
into the law-making enterprise is impossible or undesirable in both a practical and
normative sense.228 Rather than the direct, deliberative, participatory democracy of
the ancients, we moderns must sadly settle for a principle-agent model and a political division of labor that will inevitably involve some kind of aristocracy.229
In contrast, the new theories of representation hold that representation is no
mediocre substitute for democracy, but instead “an intrinsically modern way of
intertwining participation, political judgment, and the constitution of demoi capable
of self-rule.”230 Eschewing organ-body sovereignty, they do not judge representation
according to how well it reproduces a non-existent, pre-political popular will.231
They reject the common-sense notion that representatives take exogenous citizen
preferences as the “bedrock for social choice” in a linear bottom-up process that
parties: first, that there is an identifiable common good or good of the whole and, second, that
no political recognition and arrangement of parts, no dynamic of cooperation, and certainly
no dialectic of conflict can illuminate the common good.”).
226
The inception of this turn is generally credited to Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515 (2003) [hereinafter Rethinking Representation]; Andrew
Rehfeld, Towards a General Theory of Political Representation, 68 J. POL. 1 (2006); Michael
Saward, The Representative Claim, 5 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 297 (2006) [hereinafter The
Representative Claim]; and Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 774.
227
E.g., WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 134–35;
Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 758–59.
228
Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70, at 196; see also, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 192 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995) (1832) (“Where
a sovereign body . . . exercises through representatives the whole of its sovereign powers . . .
It may delegate those its powers to those its representatives, subject to a trust or trusts.”).
229
See generally BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
132 (1997); BENJAMIN CONSTANT, THE LIBERTY OF THE ANCIENTS COMPARED WITH THAT
OF THE MODERNS (1819).
230
Urbinati & Warren, supra note 45, at 402.
231
HANNAH PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 221 (1967); Saward, The Representative Claim, supra note 226, at 299–300; Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70,
at 197 (citing Sieyes, who held that the “sovereign nation was politically mute outside the electoral booth and [that] its will [is] inexpressible without and outside the representative assembly”).
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transmits those preferences into law.232 Incorporating empirical research showing
that citizens’ opinions are rarely stable outside the context of electoral politics,233
they instead hold that representatives help generate constituencies and voter demands
through the educational process of partisan advocacy.234 “Parties create, not just reflect, political interests and opinions. They formulate ‘issues’ and give them political
relevance.”235 Often, they will distinguish a group, paint it in a certain light, and then
make claims on its behalf. Group members will then either accept or reject those claims
based upon their own views236 and in light of competing messages from other representatives in an ongoing practice of judgment-formation and public deliberation.237
Elections do not ham-handedly measure any primordial democratic “sovereign”
will.238 Nor are they an imperfect, real-life reproduction of an idealized social contract whereby citizens expressly “consent” to the laws that bind them.239 Rather, they
structure participation, help constitute political debate, and “make[] citizens participate in the game of ridding themselves of governments.”240 Representatives do not
simply hew to past campaign promises. They also anticipate and frame voters’ future
judgments, sometimes on brand new issues.241 The laws they pass are the outcome
232

Lisa Disch, Towards a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Representation, 105
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 100, 101 (2011) [hereinafter Towards a Mobilization].
233
Disch, The End of Representative Politics?, supra note 77, at 1, 16.
234
Id. (relying on Laclau and Mouffe’s insights about the symbolic construction of the
“people”); Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 776.
235
ROSENBLUM, supra note 70, at 7.
236
There is a debate in the literature regarding the exogeneity of voter preferences. Some
theorists hold that voters possess pre-political interests that representative politics does not
create, but rather simply activates. Some deliberative theorists hold that the outcomes of
Rawlsian, consensus-based public discourse motored by, but somewhat independent from,
representative politics can take the place of pre-political voter interests with their model.
Others, refusing to hitch voter preferences to any outside source, are susceptible to critiques
of relativism and the impossibility of distinguishing between autonomous citizen choices and
elite manipulation. This Article attempts to bracket the issue. If translated through representative
claims, objective voter interests and exogenous preferences are captured in the theory. If they
are not, they suggest that political legitimacy is based not on democratic autonomy, but on,
for example, objective notions of justice.
237
Saward, The Representative Claim, supra note 226, at 976; Lisa Disch, The Constructivist
Turn in Democratic Representation: A Normative Dead-End?, 22 CONSTELLATIONS 487
(2015); Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 760, 766.
238
Monica B. Vieira, Representing Silence in Politics, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 976 (2020);
Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 765.
239
See discussion of majority voting, infra; see also WALDRON, The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review, supra note 36 (describing the vote as not some real-life consent
theory of government, but as a fair process that lends legitimacy to outcomes).
240
Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70, at 196 (emphasis added).
241
Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, supra note 226, at 515–18; Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 760.
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of both formal and informal decision-making procedures that “actually create[s] a
framework in which the nation can for the first time have a will.”242
For example, elections set agendas for public discussion, motivate organizing
by providing discrete targets and timelines, institutionalize “countervailing discourses”
through political competition243 and thus encourage citizens to exercise thoughtful
judgments over matters of public concern.244 They frame continuous, recursive
processes of bottom-up demands and representatives’ top-down reactions, permitting citizens to influence law-making.245 As a result, electoral politics “activate”
citizens beyond the formal act of casting a ballot and prevent public discourse from
disintegrating into a cacophony of interventions that remain unchanneled towards
any common goal.246 Representatives’ lack of a constituent-specific imperative
mandate challenges voters to think of themselves as part of a national whole:
generally, and in terms of the public good—or, at least, in terms of the abstract
interests they purport to represent.247 At the same time, representatives’ accountability to particular constituencies, along with bicameralism, (1) reinforces the notion
that there is no permanent, collective “whole” that speaks with the voice of the
sovereign “people” and;248 (2) ensures that “the specific condition of the individual
242

HOLMES, supra note 77, at 164; see also WALDRON, Precommitment and Assurance,
supra note 77, at 277; Disch, The End of Representative Politics?, supra note 77, at 10;
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 56, at 171 (representative legislative
decision-making must be “‘anchored’ in the informal streams of communication emerging
from public spheres”).
243
John S. Dryzek & Simon Niemeyer, Discursive Representation, 102 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 481, 482 (2008); ROSENBLUM, supra note 70, at 7.
244
E.g., Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70, at 194; WALDRON, The Core
of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 141–42 (“[S]tructures of representation
provide processes for judgment formation and for the deliberative engagement of judgments
both among the people and among their representatives.”) (citing Urbinati, Representation
as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 760) (comparing elections favorably to judicial decision-making
in relation to stimulating meaningful political discourse); id. at 250 (explaining how majority
voting is incorporated into deliberative bodies, including those of appellate courts); Urbinati,
Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 768 (the separation of time and space between
election campaigns and actual law-making “gives [voters] the chance to reflect by themselves . . . to defer their judgment” and “enables a critical scrutiny while shielding citizens
from the harassment of words and passions” that encourages demagoguery).
245
Jane Mansbridge, Recursive Representation in the Representative System 6–9, 21–22,
27–28 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP17-045, 2017) [hereinafter Recursive
Representation]; Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 766.
246
Urbinati & Warren, supra note 45, at 391–92; HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS, supra note 56.
247
Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70, at 210; Urbinati, Representation as
Advocacy, supra note 78, at 761, 764; WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,
supra note 36, at 136.
248
Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70, at 210; WALDRON, The Core of the
Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 80.
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citizen is not ignored.”249 Meanwhile, elected representatives take these ongoing
discourses and demands with them as they undertake their law-making responsibilities as advocates, enabling their constituents to be “present” in decision-making
through their discourses, if not their physical bodies.250
Juridically and formally, the vote is not a device that, however clumsily, aggregates voter preferences in order to translate them into statutes. Instead, it serves at
least two purposes important for political equality. First, at least when compared to
acclamation, it encourages individual citizens, with the aid of public discourse, to
form their own individual judgments over public affairs.251 Each goes alone to the
ballot box, and each decides which lever to pull. Second, it provides a “temporary
resolution of political conflict”252 in a manner that respects citizens as moral and
political equals. Majority voting is a decision-making mechanism that promises that
even if we agree neither to the outcome of our elections, nor with the law-making that
follows, we can at least believe that law-making was undertaken on fair terms. It is a
way, to use Jeremy Waldron’s language, to “give each person the greatest say possible
compatible with an equal say for each of the others.”253 Though the universal franchise
is important for maintaining a system of political equality and, importantly, legitimacy,254 it is but “one particular moment in a much larger decision-making process.”255
We should not, therefore, judge representation and other political institutions
according to their congruence with voter preferences and public opinion polls, as if
such preferences and polls truly reflect the timeless and enduring “will of the
people.” The critical yardstick is not “transcribe the will of the people” by having people, literally, transcribe their will into the statute books. The principle of justification
(e.g., popular sovereignty) and the technique of decision (direct, unmediated consensusbased democracy) do not have to overlap.256 Instead, we should judge representative
systems according to how well they allow morally equal human beings to affect, in
a fair and equal way, the laws that bind them—a fundamental norm that political
theorists Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren call “democratic autonomy.”257
249

Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 770.
Id. at 767.
251
Id. at 761, 765.
252
Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70, at 198.
253
WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 228.
254
Id. at 226 (noting that political legitimacy responds to questions of fairness rather than
to questions regarding the justice or “rightness” of particular political decisions—perhaps
including those that are “right” precisely because they reflect the “general will”).
255
Sintomer, supra note 176, at 232.
256
ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 111; cf. Montesquieu, supra note 72, at 11–12 (arguing
that the people can be the sovereign “monarch only through their wills. The [popular] sovereign’s
will is the sovereign himself. Therefore, the laws establishing the right to vote are fundamental
in this government.”).
257
Urbinati & Warren, supra note 45, at 395; see also WALDRON, The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 228.
250
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There is, as a result, a lot of room for creativity when it comes to the design of
representative institutions.258 Theorists tend to assess these institutions according to
whether and what extent they: (1) stimulate public debate and individual judgment,
such that a choice to support what is being done in citizens’ names is sufficiently
considered to amount to their participation in the law-making process;259 (2) motivate bottom-up demands that are followed by top-down responses (recursiveness or
reflexivity)260 in a manner that orients representatives to the normative—if not
ontological—priority of the represented261 by, for example, (3) permitting and mobilizing contestation;262 (4) ensuring citizens have some kind of equal influence on
decision-making, perhaps with some process of electoral authorization that shows
citizen uptake of agency policies,263 or formal registration and/or accommodation
of citizen objections. Each element not only serves democratic autonomy, but also
demonstrates the compatibility of this understanding of representation with a systemic, agonistic conception of deliberative democracy.264 Importantly, each can be
and often are served by non-electoral forms of representation.265 To provide some
obvious examples: lobbyists, non-profit public advocacy corporations, and NGOs.266
B. Accommodating Administration
The same institutional flexibility that accommodates representative politics
within a constitutional liberal democracy can likewise accommodate administrative
governance. Those who attack agencies as illegitimate lawmakers mirror the claims
that Rousseau levied against democratic representation itself. For Rousseau, the
popular sovereign could not be represented. Instead, the law must rise directly from
258

WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 36, at 78 (“Because there is no such unitary thing as ‘the people,’ there can be no single canonical way of
representing it.”).
259
Disch, Towards a Mobilization, supra note 232, at 107 (versus choices that primed out
of habit, ignorance, or stereotype); Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70; Samuel
Hayat, Representation as Proposition: Democratic Representation After the Constructivist Turn,
in THE CONSTRUCTIVIST TURN IN POLITICAL REPRESENTATION (Lisa Disch et al. eds., 2019).
260
Mansbridge, Recursive Representation, supra note 245, at 523; Disch, Towards a
Mobilization, supra note 232, at 111.
261
Vieira, supra note 238, at 976, 979; PITKIN, supra note 231, at 140; Disch, Towards
a Mobilization, supra note 232, at 107–08; WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial
Review, supra note 36, at 188, 191; Urbinati & Warren, supra note 45, at 399–400.
262
Disch, Towards a Mobilization, supra note 232, at 111; Vieira, supra note 238, at 983;
David Runciman, The Paradox of Political Representation, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 93, 95 (2007);
Laura Montanaro, The Democratic Legitimacy of Self-Appointed Representatives, 74 J. POL.
1094, 1099 (2012).
263
Vieira, supra note 238, at 976–77.
264
Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note 78, at 773–74.
265
Saward, The Representative Claim, supra note 226, at 297.
266
Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, supra note 226, at 524.
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the people.267 Representation, therefore, should be confined to a strict principalagent model, a fiduciary contract whereby the agent is stripped of any policymaking
discretion whatsoever.268 Government is to blindly obey the sovereign’s political
orders; representatives and other “ministerial,” “fiduciary” state offers could only judge
and interpret—presumably in a way that did not usurp the sovereign’s will.269
Echoing Condorcet (administration is a “roi-machine”) and Sieyès (administration
is an “intermediary commission of powers,”),270 many contemporary anti-administrativists understand agencies as the incurious fiduciaries of Congress—itself a fiduciary
of the people271—and so should, “like a machine without a mind,”272 avoid playing
any role in the formation of law and policy.273 They mimic Woodrow Wilson’s274
pleas to depoliticize bureaucracy and Frank Goodnow’s separation of the “organism” of the state into two distinct operations: those “necessary to the expression of
its will” and those “necessary to the execution of its will.”275 Likewise, the post-war
consensus assumed that agencies should serve simply as a “transmission belt” for
legislative policy.276 Administration must therefore “appear nonpartisan, scientific,
267

ROUSSEAU, supra note 69, at 229–30.
ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 135.
269
Urbinati, Continuity and Rupture, supra note 70, at 203; Sintomer, supra note 176, at
232; LOCKE, supra note 1, at 367, 369.
270
ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 29.
271
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 50, at 307–09, 337–38, arguing that the Founders
could not have believed that legislative power was nondelegable because it was thought, at
the time, that that power was, in the first instance, delegated from “the people” to their elected
representatives (understood variously as delegates, servants, or trustees).
272
Quim Brugue & Raquel A. Gellego, A Democratic Public Administration?, 5 PUB.
MGMT. REV. 425, 426 (2003).
273
This is the “agency instrumentalist” view discussed in RICHARDSON, supra note 34,
at 119, adopted by political theorists including, e.g., Christiano and Goodin, supra note 28;
and PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN CENTRAL BANKING
AND THE REGULATORY STATE 97–98 (2018). See also, e.g., Mansbridge, Recursive Representation, supra note 245, at 21; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 13; TURNER, supra note
214, at 14; Donald W. Smithburg, Political Theory and Public Administration, 13 J. POL. 59,
60 (1951); COX & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 19, at 11 (summarizing Justice Kennedy’s critique
that immigration regulation is “upside down,” subverting a separation of powers doctrine in
which the legislative makes laws and the executive, “as a dutiful agent,” enforces them);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682, 690–91 (1952) (Vinson, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority mistakenly treats the executive not as a coequal branch
of government, but as an “automaton” and an “agent” of Congress, which is “enthroned in
authority” over the President); Gerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of
Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 567 ADMIN. L. REV.
501, 505 (2005) (agencies are to be the “faithful agents” of the legislature).
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universal, efficient, purposeful.”277 For if administration starts making its own decisions, it can only interfere with the democratic sovereign—and thus, like Rousseau’s
representatives, breach their fiduciary contract. As a result, when it becomes apparent that administration and politics cannot be cleanly separated in any complex legal
regime,278 administration seems to lose much of its legitimacy.
Yet if representation is not an inferior re-presentation of the will of an embodied
popular sovereign, but instead an institutional tool that helps citizens understand
themselves as coequal participants in law-making, then there is little reason to
exclude agencies ex ante from the democratic process.279 They, like formal electoral
representation, can be a part of a system of democratic autonomy, a political order
that promises to provide everyone the greatest say possible that is also compatible
with the equal inclusion of others.
This insight is not unprecedented. French philosopher Pierre Rosanvallon argues
that independent agencies can and do serve as representative agents (of the trusteeship
variety), and provide the neutrality and impersonality that republicans once sought
from deliberative legislative bodies.280 Richard Stewart, in his seminal 1975 essay,281
described in U.S. administrative law a turn towards pluralist interest representation
and away rigid applications of the separation of powers doctrine. The interest-group
politics of administrative policymaking can, like the interest-group politics of
Congressional law-making, provide “opportunities for policy proposals to be criticized
from a variety of directions, both before and after their implementation.”282 For
Stewart, interest group representation might even serve as a new ground for agencies’
political legitimacy.283 The legitimacy ascribed through representation seems to be
embraced by agencies themselves. In its own educational literature, the “politically
independent” Federal Reserve System (The Fed) asserts that “‘decentralizing’ the
central bank into twelve districts helped to ensure more voices were represented”284
as it went about its business.
Of course, Theodore Lowi, in his famous 1969 study of interest group representation in administration, did not celebrate agencies’ pluralist politics. He lamented
277
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its “irrational” incrementalism and the influence it lent to powerful industry actors.285
In contrast, Noh points out that agencies enjoy a better capacity than Congress to
achieve ideal representative deliberation, given their smaller constituencies and limited
subject matter.286 With the concurrent rise in public interest advocacy and civil rights
legislation, agencies accommodated a growing array of individual rights by incorporating rulemaking procedures that accept input from diverse civil society representatives.287 More recently, Emerson,288 Rahman and Gilman,289 and Mansbridge290 argue
that there is an ongoing, constitutive relationship between administrative agencies
and citizens as they collaborate to make regulations. Mary E. Guy, past president of
the American Society for Public Administration, characterized the people serving
public agencies as “facilitators, interpreters, and mediators of public action”291—a
characterization that could just as easily be attributed to elected representatives. Even
Locke, despite his commitment to an organ-body conception of popular sovereignty,
theorized a connection between the executive and representation. In his theory of
government, it is up to the prince to create new representative offices if time and
social change corrupts the representativeness of extant law-making institutions.292
There is a stiff backbone of principle behind these authors’ arguments. As
mentioned above, representative systems serve democracy by structuring public
contestation, stimulating debate, and provoking judgment. They thereby permit
disaggregated and diverse citizens to participate in the process of forming collective
purposes. One can observe this dynamic within agency decision-making, demonstrated by public reactions following recent Executive Orders regarding immigration,
environmental deregulation, etc. They mobilize objections, enabling citizens to
make judgments about agency responses. The public criticism to which agencies are
routinely subject are sufficient to limit, at least according to Vermeule and Posner,
executive agencies far more effectively than do the tenets of statutory delegation and
the separation of powers.293
Moreover, agencies serve as fora for the kind of non-electoral political representation that supplements political equality by calling forth previously ignored or silent
constituencies.294 In the past, minority communities excluded from electoral politics
285
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fruitfully engaged with administrators tasked with implementing social welfare
rights.295 Administrative experiments in participatory budgeting and collaborative
governance encourage citizens’ engagement in the infrastructure shaping their lives.296
They can, in Waldron’s terms, “secur[e] multiple points of access for citizen input”
and thus add to the “housing” of the kind of public deliberation that promises to
secure democratic autonomy.297
Indeed, administration can, perhaps better than Congress, provide a forum where
“conflicts and rendered both comprehensible and solvable” and where the values at
stake are sufficiently “specific and understandable to generate opinions and dialogue.”298 Because an elected representative will make a variety of unrelated claims
regarding law-making in a generalized arena—Congress—the potential exercise of
political power can become obscure. In contrast, an agency with a particular subject
matter jurisdiction can attract representatives and generate claims that target the
specific policies that impact citizens’ lives. They give rise to “affected constituencies,” providing “a point of identification around which [citizens] might coalesce as
a ‘people’ or demos defined along some dimensions of common interest.”299 Civil
society and public interest representatives, for example, have a better opportunity
to exercise judgment on and lodge objections to how much pollution is permitted in
drinking water (EPA); whether discrimination claims are adequately enforced
(Department of Justice); and how policing is executed (“citizen audits” of local
departments). In fact, many social movements target their organizing around agency
jurisdictions.300 In other words, agencies provide an opportunity for citizens to form
the kind of considered political judgments that new theories of representation value.
It is agencies that can provide that factual information necessary for citizens who
seek to exercise judgment on many matters of public concern.301 One need only
consider the usefulness of CDC scientists to democratic deliberation during a
pandemic. As a result, agencies, like electoral politics, facilitate the “circulation of
judgment and opinion that should unite state institutions and the citizens.”302
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.currentaffairs.org/2020/08/our-money-where-our-mouth-is
[https://perma.cc/SW5Q-4FEC]. Notably, Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy, supra note
78, at 762–65, notes that even purportedly “direct” Athenian democracy involved nonelectoral representation. Though each citizen could come to the forum, inevitably only a few
would speak, and they would speak on behalf of interest groups.
295
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Furthermore, agencies themselves serve as representatives of underserved consumer and minority interests.303 For example, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), created in response to the capture and fragmentation of financial
regulators in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, was tasked to protect the consumers
of financial products.304 Typically, consumers are poorly situated to influence banking
regulation through normal channels. Accordingly, the CFPB serves not as a neutral
bureaucracy, but as consumers’ “proxy advocate” (representative!) that solicits the
input of veterans, students, and pensioners.305 Meanwhile, financial institutions receive
(more than) equal representation in other policymaking locations. The CFPB both
educates and solicits the opinions and complaints of those who do not normally
possess the capacity to make their voices heard when lawmakers turn their attention
to high finance.306 Indeed, the Progressives who supported New Deal agencies created them precisely to balance public might against the already over-represented
“aristocracy of wealth.”307 An agency, serving as a counterpower capable of breaking up monopolies or safeguarding labor rights,308 can speak for the consumers and
workers neglected by elected politicians.309 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a
1932 campaign speech, expressed this idea in colorful language. He dubbed regulators the “Tribune[s] of the people.”310 During Reconstruction, federal agencies spoke
for those recently freed from slavery when local governments did not.311
C. Implications
The lesson offered by the representative turn within political theory is that agencies
should be democratized. The goal, however, is not to transform administrative bodies
303
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into deliberative mini-publics. Instead, it is to take advantage of the strengths of representative systems: effective decision-making in a manner that respects the normative
priority of the represented while remaining sensitive to individuals’ equal political and
social dignity. Assessing administration in terms of democratic autonomy can allow
us to understand problematic agency decisions in a new and productive light. In this
section, this Article will discuss at what such critiques and reforms might look like.
1. Non-Delegation as a Problem of Equal Representation
Many critiques of administrative discretion are perhaps more aptly described as
problems of representativeness than as impermissible delegations of legislative
power. In A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,312 the Supreme Court held
that the National Industrial Recovery Act improperly delegated legislative power to
the Executive. At the same time, the Act, despite goals of incorporating labor and
consumer interests, became captured by business leaders through: the direct appointment of industry officers to rulemaking bodies; the nontransparency of business
operations; and the state’s reliance on industry organizations to implement any new
rules.313 As a result, the early New Deal is objectionable not because of broad and
vague statutory mandates. It is objectionable because of its lack of democratic representativeness. Many citizens did not enjoy an equal chance to affect regulation
because their representatives were shut out of the process.
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau314 faces similar critique. Giving the president the power to fire
the CFPB’s chief without cause deprives the agency of independence from those
already well-positioned to influence financial law, that is, those with access to the
presidential ear. It is a problem likewise echoed during the late eighteenth-century
Post Roads Debate.315 Certain Congressional representatives balked at assigning the
president broad discretion to establish the locations of new postal roads and offices.
Such discretion would give the president “a dangerous power of establishing offices
and roads in those places only where his interest would be promoted.”316 The concern
was not over presidential power as such, but that the president would remain deaf
to the concerns of others whom his policies might affect.317
Agency failures to achieve equal representation include not just the lack of formal
inclusion of interests in decision-making. Within agency decision-making procedures,
inequalities in wealth and experience may reproduce the same distortions of political
312
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equality that disfigure electoral politics.318 Agencies are accused of capture for good
reason. Given lobbyists’ outsized role in rulemaking and the self-appointment of
interest group leaders, it is at best unclear whether agencies remain oriented towards
the normative priority of the represented in an equal way.319 It therefore may make
sense to, where practicable, decentralize policymaking authority, establish countervailing agencies as points of access, and to populate agency boards with both citizen
and public representatives in structures of collaborative governance.320 If constituents
are granted formal rights of authorization (e.g., to elect such representatives), they
can ensure agencies orient themselves in the right direction.321 Further, staffing offices
with representatives drawn from underserved constituencies may further the kind of descriptive representation that encourages mutual education, authorization and uptake.322
They might take on employees whose internal motivations appear consistent with
citizens’ judgments through a version of gyroscopic representation.323 For example,
an agency tasked with consumer financial protection could draw its staff from consumer advocacy groups.
Agencies can also play a role in improving democratic representativeness more
broadly by helping to create new constituencies from those previously excluded.
Electoral politics privileges citizen voice over silence. They therefore privilege those
with more cultural and material resources.324 But agencies can be a bit more attentive
to those left out of the traditional campaign circus. Recently, the mayoralties of New
York City and Boston adopted on-the-ground, campaign style outreach programs that
created new, underserved constituencies around enrollment in Pre-K and neighborhood development programs.325 Agencies can “generate and mobilize awareness of
structural oppression, disruptive claims, and reform.”326 Assembled into newly
educated constituencies, excluded citizens might then demand more attention from
elected politicians. Further, because many agencies actively distribute resources,
they can alter the “background distribution of local political power”327 that presently
serves to cement political inequality.328 Parents benefitting from free universal Pre-K
might use their newly freed resources to engage more actively in politics.
318
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2. Technocracy, Non-Delegation and Representation
Given the potential of capture, it is tempting to inoculate agencies from interest
group pressure by granting them political independence.329 Indeed, this “juridical”
solution was suggested by the early twentieth-century Progressive Legal Realists,330
and the technocratic “good governance” reformers of the 1990s and 2000s.331 Under
this kind of scheme, agencies can only credibly claim to vindicate democratic sovereignty if (1) there is a clearly identified and consensus-based public interest, or
“will” that (2) neutral expert agency officials, as fiduciaries, can be trusted to fulfill.332
Yet finding consensus is often difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, experts commonly disagree and these disagreements may implicate questions of morality and
ethics.333 Of all the lessons of the 2008 financial crisis, one of the most important is
that not even central banking is a matter of apolitical, non-controversial scientific
management.334 Ascribed an open-ended duty to expertly manage employment levels
and price stability,335 the Federal Reserve System is perhaps the strongest example
of a violation of the non-delegation doctrine.336 What’s more, for the past dozen years,
the Fed’s decisions can no longer credibly be described as merely technocratic.337
It engages in distributional politics as it decides to divert public resources to some actors
but not to others.338 Regardless, any choice between inflation, which tends to harm
329
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wealthy asset-holders and benefit debtors, and unemployment (benefitting labor) has
distributional consequences.339 It thus makes value-laden political choices—choices
that, given the complexity and importance of macroeconomic management, many
feel uncomfortable placing into the hands of the vagaries of popular lay sentiment.340
The good news is that because representative democracy requires only democratic autonomy and not universal consent, it can tolerate barriers to popular input.
It might even include those barriers erected by complex issues that only experts can
fully understand. Rather than throwing the technocratic baby out with the nondelegation bath water, constitutional democracies can achieve both the benefit of
expertise and citizen participation through representative politics.341 Recall that
democratic autonomy does not require that citizens, literally, transcribe their wills
into law as a public “general will.” Instead, it only requires that citizens play an
equal role in creating the rules that bind them. They can participate equally by: (1)
electing the regulatory experts that set policy, or, more feasibly; (2) seeing that their
particular interests are represented on the Fed board. Seats might be staffed not only
by financial industry players and academic macroeconomists, but also by labor and
consumer advocates.
Further, experts themselves can serve as competing democratic representatives.
They might present citizens with alternative views of what is desirable and possible
and thereby stimulate public debate and feedback.342 Elite expertise can be countered
by competing expertise to prevent a monopolization of public discourse.343 Moore, for
example, proposes a theory of critical elitism that would provide ongoing opportunities for citizens to oppose, scrutinize, and protest expert conclusions within a system
of deliberative democracy.344 Rahman argues that there can be a way to “embed”
expertise within democratic institutions and democratic reason.345 Administrative
specialists can “engage in ethical reasoning, not as a cloistered group of enlightened
experts, but rather as partners with affected persons.”346 Congress itself specifically
seeks expert opinions from agencies because policy goals might be ill-served by
339
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reliance on lay opinion.347 Democratic citizens can use representative expert guidance
not only as they consider agency actions, but also in engaging in the kind of deliberation and considered judgment that representative theory endorses more generally.348
To be sure, an expert’s claim to possess truth and knowledge can also amount
to a claim for authority that competes with democratic legitimacy.349 The truth should
govern, no matter other people’s opinions about it. Experts’ claims can therefore
lead to an undemocratic concentration of power.350 What’s more, there is a kind of
latent totalitarianism implied by claims to comprehend the entire world.351 A belief in
one’s own perfect understanding of society will also tempt one to remake it without
popular input. Yet we should not allow such worries to paralyze us. Knowledge is
also liberating. Vacuum cleaners, washing machines, and other technological improvements allow us more choices in life. As Neumann observed, it is only armed with
science and knowledge—however imperfect—that citizens can overcome the anxiety
associated with an uncertain and unpredictable world and free themselves of the
constraints of necessity.352 “The realization of freedom,” he reminds us, is not always
“at the disposal of man’s free will.”353 Only knowledge can expand the zone of such
realization. The democratic function of increased knowledge of both nature and
humankind is that it can both show us new possibilities and how to achieve them.354
Less abstractly, the importance of agency effectiveness, and thus the salience
of technological expertise, only grows once democratic publics append positive
social and economic rights to their menu of negative liberties.355 It is one thing to
347
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promise full employment; it is quite another to fulfill this promise. Realizing rights
requires the use of experts and the collection of data. This is why Italian political
theorist Norberto Bobbio was able to argue that “[a]ll states which have become more
democratic have simultaneously become more bureaucratic.”356 Administration is, per
Jurgen Habermas, “not just a functionally necessary supplement to the system of
rights but implications already contained in rights.”357 The protection and vindication
of individual rights are perhaps “best addressed by officials who, through repeated
encounters with a particular class of disputes, understood their origins.”358 The affinities between expertise and rights is why anti-administrative attacks against bureaucratization at least occasionally conceal attempts to “if not dismantle democratic
power, then certainty to reduce it to within clearly circumscribed limits.”359 Without
experts, rights are really just parchment promises.
Moreover, Emerson suggests that the tension between democratic autonomy and
expertocracy can be a productive, constitutive one.360 Citizens (and their representatives) routinely challenge received truths from would-be Guardians. For example,
after the 2008 financial crises, many recognized that purportedly neutral, technocratic
economic reasoning often rests on debatable values and debatable science. One need
only observe the fruitful work on MMT361 and heterodox Keynesianism362—indeed,
Keynesianism itself363—to know that expertise is fruitfully politicized. The field of
inquiry where “reason compels a unique result”364 is smaller than one might expect—
and getting smaller.
3. Representation and the Chevron365 Shuffle
Theories of representation can also inform an enduring problem of administrative law: whether and to what extent courts should permit agencies to interpret their
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own implementing statutes.366 Theories of representation, which privilege democratic
autonomy, suggest that, at the very least, agencies should not provide an opportunity
to relitigate de novo the hard compromises already settled by Congress in regular
law-making.367 Whatever democratic autonomy is vindicated through Congressional
law-making, that autonomy should not be undermined by agency decisions taken
behind citizens’ backs. As a result, whether an agency interpretation is “reasonable”
and whether Congress’ intent is “clear”368 should be informed by whether and what
extent that party seeks to undo what Congress has done.
Historically, those enjoying an unequal share of resources have exploited agency
rulemaking processes to undo laws they find repugnant.369 This is particularly true
during periods of divided and polarized party government when agencies are the
only fora amenable to new policy initiatives.370 As a result, major policy reversals
made exclusively within the ambit of agency decision-making may deprive many
of their ability to understand themselves as coequal political participants.371 Unless
agencies are opened to some kind of regular popular feedback mechanism, such
relitigation may threaten political equality or amount to a form of corporatism that
leads to the privatization of public functions.372
This superficial commitment to statutory formalism is not based on the principles
of non-delegation. Congress is not the source of the general will (legibus solutus).
It is rather to acknowledge that Congressional statutes can reflect the exercise of
democratic autonomy373 and that agency action should not contradict them—not
unless it has a stronger claim to democratic autonomy. And it is quite possible that
agency decision-making might at least occasionally better vindicate the principle of
366
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democratic autonomy. In a partisan era of omnibus legislation accomplished through
the budget reconciliation process, agencies might provide a more accessible point
of entry for representative politics.374 Moreover, if the policies at issue impact only
a small subset of the population, agencies with representative decision-making
processes might be better placed to serve democratic autonomy of affected constituents. Finally, it is not unusual for Congress to punt contentious political issues to
agencies for resolution (or the avoidance thereof).375 Unless those agencies include
some kind of representative decision-making procedure, what policies result may
lack any legitimacy whatsoever.
Rather than assigning to administration the task of execution and to Congress
the task of promulgating “clear” and detailed implementing statutes, it may make
more sense to divide responsibilities according to the contentiousness of the issues
involved—regardless of whether we characterize those issues as “means” or “ends.”
When citizens mobilize around an issue, resolving their conflict in a forum that allows
each (more) direct influence in a single national conversation may best serve democratic autonomy.376 To illustrate, we might encourage Congressional representative
politics when undertaking a highly politicized decision to increase the deficit to stave
off depression. The choice involves deeply rooted moral and technical conflicts. On
the other hand, we might insulate CDC doctors and IRS accountants unless and until
a significant opposition is mobilized.
CONCLUSION
As the left flank of the Democratic Party spitballs ideas about a Green New
Deal, the nationalization of health care, anti-monopoly, and other business regulation,
it is perhaps more urgent than ever to find legitimate ground for the public bodies
that will inevitably be tasked to implement them. Vague instructions to “democratize” administration are insufficient. Instead, institutional design should remain
sensitive to extant political structures and how they serve democratic autonomy. We
should ask how agencies can and do help citizens understand themselves as coequal
participants in making the laws that bind them. This may mean that some agencies
should not, in fact, be fully democratized—particularly if they are to act as partial
374
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things for any number of reasons—not just because Congress lacked an “intent” to regulate.
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representatives themselves or if they aim to exploit the advantages of expertise. A
labor board should not allow itself to be captured by corporate leadership. Additionally, monetary policymakers should not take direction from unfiltered social media
posts. Hotly contested issues might best be left for resolution in Congress through
national elections. Meanwhile, tax authorities and CDC officials might be insulated
from political pressure unless and until their actions become politicized. By understanding the lessons of political theory’s representative turn, it is possible to embed
agencies within constitutional, democratic decision-making institutions. And it is
possible that they can also be embedded in a way that vindicates their virtues of
effectiveness and expertise—while also ensuring that citizens enjoy an equal chance
to shape their collective goals. It is time to bring administration home from its
constitutional exile.

